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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

DICKIE'S INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF ART:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

BY

DOUGLAS SIMAK

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled DICKIE'S INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF ART: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS submitted by DOUGLAS SIMAK in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

ABSTRACT

One of the perennial problems in aesthetics concerns the formulation of an acceptable definition of "art". George Dickie's proposed definition, found in various articles and in his book Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis, adds a new dimension to the problem. Dickie suggests that "art" must be defined in terms of a relation that exists between the object and the artworld. This proposal is a dramatic break from tradition, and can be understood as a consequence of the attacks on traditional aesthetics by some of the followers of Wittgenstein.

The first chapter of the thesis examines the philosophical background to the institutional theory of art, while the second is an exposition of the actual theory. Chapters three through five constitute a critical examination of the theory. The sixth chapter argues that an improper understanding of modern art led Dickie to formulate the theory. Chapter seven will deal with possible revisions and the overall importance of the theory.

A series of abbreviations for journal titles are used in the footnotes. They are as follows:

American Philosophical Quarterly	APQ
Analysis	Anal
Australian Journal of Philosophy	AJP
British Journal of Aesthetics	BJA
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism	JAAC
Journal of Aesthetic Education	JAE
Journal of Chinese Philosophy	JCP
Journal of Philosophy	JP
Philosophia	Phil
Philosophical Forum	PF
Philosophical Review	PR
Southern Journal of Philosophy	SJP
Southwestern Journal of Philosophy	SWJP
Theoria	Theo
The Personalist	Pers

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CHAPTER ONE

OPEN CONCEPTS AND THE ESSENTIALIST ASSUMPTION

Aesthetics, like philosophy in general, has a tradition that can be traced back to classical Greece. From the time of Plato, there have been attempts to answer the question, "What is art?". More recently, the question has been considered in a different form. Instead of addressing the question, "What is art?", much of twentieth century aesthetics concerns the question, "What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the concept "art"?". This restructured question reflects the general acceptance of the claim that language is essential with regard to philosophical questions. With the focal point becoming one of language, methodological assumptions that have rarely been the subject of controversy are now being questioned.

In particular, what has been called the essentialist assumption has become the center of dispute. This assumption is clearly manifest in the work of Clive Bell.

For either all works of visual art have some common quality, or when we speak of "works of art" we gibber. Everyone speaks of "art", making a mental classification by which he distinguishes the class "works of art" from all other classes.¹

The essentialist assumption involves the claim that all members of any given class, for example, art objects, have some common feature which unites them as members of the class. However, the assumption involves more than the claim that the objects have some common feature. Bell makes this clear.

What is the quality common and peculiar to all members of this class? Whatever it be, no doubt it is often found in company with other qualities; but they are adventitious--it is essential. There must be some one quality without which a work of art cannot exist; possessing which in the least degree, no work is altogether worthless.²

Two points concerning the essentialist assumption are made here. First, it is an essential, not accidental, characteristic that the members of the class share. Second, any object which has this characteristic is a member of the class. Possession of such a characteristic is, therefore, both a necessary and sufficient condition for membership in the class. The question, "What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the concept of "art"?", clearly reflects the essentialist assumption. However, both the question and its underlying assumption are the subject of a dispute in aesthetics.

The objection is that this formulation of the question limits the range of answers in a way that the traditional formulation does not. This limitation, according to some, precludes the possibility that a satisfactory answer to the question can be found. One individual who forwards this objection is William Kennick.

The assumption that despite their differences, all works of art must possess some common nature, some distinctive set of characteristics which serves to separate Art from everything else, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their being works of art at all, is both natural and disquieting, and constitutes what I consider to be the first mistake on which traditional aesthetics rests.³

Kennick's position is that the acceptance of the essentialist assumption constitutes a serious error on the part of philosophers. The assumption does not help to elucidate and solve the problem of defining art, but rather leaves the problem more complicated, as well as leading to restrictions on the range of possible answers to the question.

The rejection of the essentialist assumption and traditional methodology by Kennick, and others, can be seen as a consequence of the influence of Wittgenstein. In particular, Wittgenstein's family resemblance thesis has led to the break from tradition in aesthetics. Wittgenstein suggests that not all concepts can be analysed in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and he illustrates this contention by means of a discussion of "game".

Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?--Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called "games"

--but look and see whether there is anything common to all. --For if you look at them you will not see something common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look!--Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear....And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.⁴

At least two important claims are involved here. First, it has simply been assumed that all members of any given class have an essential characteristic. Second, if one observes the way some concepts function, for example, game, one can see that not all concepts behave in accordance with the essentialist assumption. Perhaps the dispute between Wittgenstein and the essentialist can best be understood in terms of metaphors. Both Wittgenstein and the essentialist can be seen as viewing concepts as analogous to ropes.⁵ The essentialist claims that each rope has one common strand which runs the rope's entire length. There may be various strands which are present in only part of the rope, but one strand must run throughout. This common strand is the essential, common property, while all other strands are accidental properties. On the other hand, Wittgenstein's understanding of concepts allows that some ropes are composed of overlapping fibres, with no fibre, or strand, running the rope's total length. Thus, there is no essential, common property. Wittgenstein suggests an alternative way of characterizing his view.

I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.--And I shall say: "games" form a family.⁶

In light of such a characterization, the basis for objections to the essentialist assumption becomes clear.

The formulation of the question concerning the nature of art in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions precludes the possibility of understanding "art" in a way that is analogous with Wittgenstein's account of "games"; and it is precisely this analogy which Kennick, and

others, wish to pursue.

Despite the temptation to think that if we look long enough and hard enough at works of art we shall find the common denominator in question, after all the fruitless scrutinizing that has already been done, it is still more tempting to think that we are looking for something that is not there, like looking for the equator or the line on the spectrum that separates orange from red.⁷

One can see why Kennick considers the acceptance of the essentialist assumption to be a mistake. The "logic" of the concept is not open to analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.

Moris Weitz is even more explicit in his acceptance of the claim that the concept of "art" should be understood in a way that is analogous to "game".

The problem of the nature of art is like that of the nature of games, at least in these respects: If we actually look and see what it is that we call "art", we find no common properties--only strands of similarities. Knowing what art is is not apprehending some manifest or latent essence but being able to recognize, describe and explain those things we call "art" in virtue of these similarities.⁸

The opponents of traditional aesthetics and the essentialist assumption argue for an analysis of "art" as an "open concept"; such concepts being those which involve family resemblances and similarities rather than concepts which are "closed" by essential characteristics.

Three considerations, or arguments, are forwarded by Weitz to support his claim that art is an open concept. The first of these is simply an observation of a historical nature; no closed concept analysis has been successfully formulated.

Is aesthetic theory, in the sense of a true definition or set of necessary properties of art, possible? If nothing else does, the history of aesthetics itself should give one enormous pause here. For, in spite of the many theories, we seem no nearer our goal today that we were in Plato's time.⁹

Weitz reflects a sentiment that is also present in Kennick. Despite all the effort, success does not appear near. Given that the problem of defining art has been considered for over two thousand years, open concept theorists contend the failure of philosophy to provide a satisfactory definition in terms of a closed concept opens the possibility that

there is no such definition forthcoming. This consideration alone is far from conclusive, but Weitz offers two other arguments to support his claim.

Weitz claims that art-making is a creative activity, and that a closed concept would limit the creative potential of artists.

What I am arguing, then, is that the very expansive, adventurous character of art, its ever-present changes and novel creations, makes it logically impossible to ensure any set of defining properties.¹⁰

Artists are always experimenting, and broadening the horizons of art-making. According to Weitz, if art were a closed concept, then when the time came when artists were producing objects that lacked the essential characteristic, or characteristics, of art, then these objects could not be classified as art. For example, if being an imitation of something in the world were a necessary condition for something's being a work of art, it would follow that when an artist produced an object that was not imitative, it would not be art.¹¹

Weitz offers another argument to support his claim that art is an open concept. This argument concerns the membership in the class of art objects.

"Art", itself, is an open concept. New conditions (cases) have constantly arisen and will undoubtedly constantly arise; new art forms, new movements will emerge, which demand decisions on the part of those interested, usually professional critics, as to whether the concept should be extended or not.¹²

Today's class of art objects includes members which range from the paintings and sculptures of antiquity to the conceptual art of the twentieth century.¹³ Weitz maintains that it is unreasonable to search for an essential nature in such a group, particularly since the group is constantly changing.

The arguments are designed to demonstrate that any account of art in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions must be inadequate. They also serve as evidence that "art" must be understood as an open concept. Closed concepts determine class membership solely on the grounds of the essential characteristic, or characteristics. Membership in a class, on an open concept model, is determined by means of "criteria of recogni-

tion". These criteria are a list of important features which are shared by members of the class. No one feature is common to all members, and different members share different features. If an object possesses a sufficient quantity of these characteristics, then it is admitted as a member of the class. Such an account allows sufficient conditions for class membership, but not necessary conditions.¹⁴

Weitz's arguments against traditional aesthetics do not provide any basis for criticism of an open concept analysis of art. Open concepts do not, for example, limit the potential of artists for creativity in art-making. There is no feature that an object must possess for it to be art. All that is required is that the object share important characteristics with recognized art works. This seems to characterize the phenomena as they actually exist in the artworld. In addition, the fact that the class of art objects is diverse and constantly changing is accounted for in terms of different sets of similarities being emphasized. Weitz's account of art in terms of an open concept seems to avoid the criticism he brings to bear against traditional aesthetics, as well as accounting for the actual activity involved in art-making.

There have been attempts to undercut Weitz's arguments, and the conclusion the arguments are designed to support. One such attempt is by William Bywater. With respect to the argument claiming that no closed concept analysis has been found, Bywater asserts the following:

If FAS [fruitless search argument] is an empirical claim, it is a very easy argument to refute. In fact, it appears to be a variant of the informal fallacy often called argumentum ad ignorartian. Just as we cannot say Jones is a scoundrel from the fact that we have heard nothing good about Jones, so we cannot say there is no feature (or set of them) common to all works of art simply because no one has discovered it (or them).¹⁵

Bywater goes on to examine whether the argument can be understood in a way which puts it in a more positive light. His answer is a qualified no.

Whereas it looks as if Kennick and Weitz believe that they have singled out a fact--a neutral fact whose significance everyone would have to accept--when they attack a traditional theorist like Parker with this fact, its force suddenly fades. The most one can claim is that this fact softens up

the reader so that he will be more willing to accept the Weitz/Kennick view, but, still, the reader will find the fact of no consequence unless he is already predisposed towards the position Weitz and Kennick represent.¹⁶

The basic criticism that Bywater is directing towards both Weitz and Kennick is that any attempt to conclude from the failure of aesthetics to provide a closed definition that no such definition exists is simply to beg the question.

Important criticism of Weitz's arguments is also found in the work of Maurice Mandelbaum. Mandelbaum explicitly addresses the claim that a closed concept analysis would interfere with artistic creativity.

Unfortunately, Professor Weitz fails to offer any cogent argument in substantiation of this claim. The lacuna in his discussion is to be found in the fact that the question of whether a particular concept is open or closed (i.e., whether a set of necessary and sufficient conditions can be offered for its use) is not identical with the question of whether future instances to which the very same concept is applied may or may not possess genuinely novel properties. In other words, Professor Weitz has not shown that every novelty in the instances to which we apply a term involves a stretching of the term's connotation.¹⁷

Mandelbaum illustrates his claim that Weitz has failed to offer any real argument for his conclusion with a discussion of a definition of art that existed before the development of the camera.

For example, if the concept "a work of art" had been carefully defined prior to the invention of cameras, is there any reason to suppose that such a definition would have proved an obstacle to viewing photography or the movies as constituting new art forms? To be sure, one can imagine definitions which might have done so. However, it was not Professor Weitz's aim to show that one or another definition of art had been a poor definition; he wished to establish the general thesis that there was a necessary incompatibility, which he denoted as a logical impossibility, between allowing for novelty and creativity in the arts and stating the defining properties of a work of art.¹⁸

Weitz has failed to offer adequate support for the claim that there is a logical incompatibility between a closed concept and creativity. He claims such incompatibility exists, but he argues for this claim only by citing examples. Mandelbaum points out that this is insufficient since such examples can only establish that the incompatibility sometimes exists,

not that the incompatibility is logically necessary. Thus it is an open question whether an adequate account of art, one that allows for creativity, can be formulated in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.

The importance of Mandelbaum's discussion is manifest in his examination of the groundwork to Weitz's position. Mandelbaum explicitly addresses Wittgenstein, the family resemblance thesis, and the example of "games". With respect to the family resemblance thesis, Mandelbaum denies that it provides an adequate analysis of common nouns. He considers Wittgenstein's example of "games". The contention is that if one "looks and sees", as Wittgenstein suggests, one will conclude, for example, that telling fortunes is a game because of its apparent similarity to solitaire. Similar considerations apply with respect to wrestling and street-fighting.¹⁹ The conclusion reached is that simply to "look and see" is not adequate. Something more is required.

Wittgenstein, however, failed to make explicit the fact that the literal, root notion of a family resemblance includes this genetic connection no less than it includes the existence of noticeable physiognomic resemblances. Had the existence of such a two-fold criterion been made explicit to him, he would have noted that there is in fact an attribute common to all who bear a family resemblance to each other: they are related through a common ancestry.²⁰

Wittgenstein's discussion of the family resemblance thesis is inadequate because it concentrates solely on the notion of resemblance, while ignoring that of family. Concentration on the notion of family allows one to distinguish between playing solitaire and telling fortunes, and to recognize that one is a game while the other is not. The importance of the family notion is not evident in the family resemblance thesis because of Wittgenstein's claim that one need only "look and see".

With the importance of the notion of family in mind, Mandelbaum discusses the possibility of defining "game". He concurs with Wittgenstein that if one simply "looks and sees" one will fail to find anything but similarities. However, a definition may involve more than physical resemblances.

In the case of games, the analogue to genetic ties might be the purpose for the sake of which various games were formulated by those who invented or modified them, e.g., the poten-

tiality of a game to be of absorbing non-practical interest to either participants or spectators.²¹

Such a possibility has consequences for the position advocated by Weitz. If it is possible to offer an account of "games" in terms of such non-exhibited properties, then this possibility may exist for "art". Mandelbaum makes this point.

For example, art has sometimes been characterized as being one special form of communication or of expression, or as being a special form of wish-fulfillment, or as being a presentation of truth in sensuous form. Such theories do not assume that in each poem, painting, play, and sonata there is a specific ingredient which identifies it as a work of art; rather, that which is held to be common to these otherwise diverse objects is a relationship which is assumed to have existed, or is known to have existed, between certain of their characteristics and the activities and the intentions of those who made them.²²

This opens the possibility that a closed concept analysis of art may be formulated in terms of qualities that one cannot find by "looking and seeing".

As a result of the Mandelbaum discussion, three distinctions are important. The first of these is between exhibited properties and non-exhibited properties. Mandelbaum makes this distinction in his discussion of the resemblance notion and the genetic notion. The resemblance notion concerns only exhibited properties. Such properties are ones that can be recognized purely on the basis of perception. "Redness" is an example of this type of property. In order to determine if an object is red, all one needs to do is "look and see" whether the object has this property.²³ Non-exhibited properties are such that they cannot be recognized solely on a perceptual basis. An example of such a property is that of being a brother. In order to determine if someone is another person's brother one must have knowledge of a person's origins, of certain "genetic" connections the individual has. One cannot, solely by perception, determine if the conditions of being a brother are met in any particular case.

The second distinction is between relational properties and non-relational properties. Consider "Jones has blue eyes" and "Jones is a philosophy student". Both of these statements attribute a property to

Jones. The former, a non-relational property, is a property that can be recognized upon an immediate examination of Jones. Non-relational properties are properties that do not depend upon anything other than the individual, or object, to which they are attributed. The latter example, a relational property, is not a property that can be understood without reference to things other than the individual to which the property is attributed. A complete explication of relational properties requires that one understand certain relations that exist between the entities which possess them and the world.

The third distinction is between brute properties and institutional properties.²⁴ Consider "Jones is a man" and "Jones is married". The first statement indicates a brute property, while the second indicates an institutional property. The reason that the first indicates a brute property is that it involves simply a statement about the world, independent of any society. If Jones had lived ten thousand years ago, he would still have possessed the characteristic of being a man. However, the second statement is not of such a nature. While Jones may be married today, the truth of such a claim depends on the society in which Jones lives. Our concept of marriage has certain restraints and conditions placed on it by our religious and legal institutions. If these institutions did not exist, then the concept of marriage that we have could not. If Jones had lived ten thousand years ago, and marriage with its relevant institutions had not yet evolved, then Jones could not possess the property of being married. It would be false, or meaningless, to say that Jones is married.²⁵

It is clear from the examples that the distinctions overlap in many instances. This is a consequence of the fact that they are simply different ways of characterizing facts. Being a brother, for example, was presented as an example of a non-exhibited property.²⁶ It is also a relational property and a brute property. Given this situation, it is useful to examine the relationships between these distinctions. Since there are three distinctions, there are eight possible combinations.²⁷ This suggests that there are eight different classes of facts to be recognized. However, some of the combinations are such that no fact can

be classified in such a manner.

Institutional properties are ones that can only be understood with reference to society. This entails that all institutional properties must be understood as being relational in nature. Certain relations must hold between the individual to whom the property is attributed and society, and possibly between individuals in light of society's institutions. Therefore, any combination of the distinctions that concerns institutional properties and non-relational properties must result in a class in which no facts exist. This eliminates the possibility of two classes containing members.²⁸ In addition, an understanding of institutional properties denies the possibility that any institutional properties can also be exhibited properties. Institutional properties involve the existence of relations between individuals and society. Such relations are not exhibited. Therefore, all institutional properties are non-exhibited properties. This eliminates a third possible class of facts from having any membership.²⁹ No property can be both non-exhibited and non-relational. If a property is non-exhibited, then it cannot be understood without reference to the world. This entails that such a property can be characterized as non-relational, since non-relational properties can be characterized without reference to the world. A fourth class of facts, which has not yet been eliminated, is now seen to be an empty class.³⁰

There are four possible combinations of the distinctions which result in classes of facts that have members. Exhibited, relational, brute properties exist. Such properties can be perceived, involve relations, and can be understood independent of any society. An example of such a property is "being to the left of". Properties which are non-exhibited, relational and brute also exist. A property having such a nature involves relations, being a property that one cannot see, and exists without dependence on society. "Being a brother" is a property of this nature. "Being married" is a non-exhibited, relational, institutional property. Being married involves relations. One cannot "look and see" whether any individual is married, and marriage requires the existence of certain societal institutions. Exhibited, non-relational, brute

properties also exist. "Being red" is such a property. It can be seen, and does not involve any society, or relations to the world.³¹

Given these distinctions, a concrete response to the Weitz/Kennick arguments can be formulated. Their arguments that claim to demonstrate that art must be an open concept may have force if one views the attempts at closed definitions in terms of non-relational properties, exhibited properties and brute properties. However, as Mandelbaum suggests, the possibility of defining art in terms of non-exhibited, relational and institutional properties exists. Therefore, the Weitz arguments fail because not all of the possibilities have been considered. The situation is a standoff. Advocates of the open concept analysis of art have failed to provide arguments that demonstrate that art must be an open concept. Proponents of the closed concept analysis of art have failed to forward an adequate analysis of art in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Neither side is in a position to refute its opponent's view, nor to give an adequate defense of its own.

CHAPTER ONE FOOTNOTES

1. Clive Bell, "Art As Significant Form", reprinted in Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, eds. George Dickie and Richard Sclafani (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p.37.
2. Ibid., p.38.
3. William Kennick, "Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest On A Mistake?", reprinted in Contemporary Studies In Aesthetics, ed. Francis Coleman (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p.413.
4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1953), p.31 (paragraph 66).
5. Wittgenstein discusses this metaphor. See ibid., p.32 (paragraph 67).
6. Ibid., p.32 (paragraph 67).
7. William Kennick, op.cit., p.414.
8. Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics", reprinted in Contemporary Studies In Aesthetics, op.cit., p.89.
9. Ibid., p.84.
10. Ibid., p.90.
11. A version of the imitation theory is used in this example. Theories such as Formalism and Expressionism function analogously.
12. Morris Weitz, op.cit., p.90.
13. For a discussion of unusual twentieth century art see Richard Sclafani's "What Kind of Nonsense is This?", JAAC, volume 33, number 4, Summer 1975.
14. It has been argued that the open concept approach eventually leads to the conclusion that there should be only one common noun. See Robert Richman's "Something Common", JP, volume 59, number 26. Such criticism will not be considered here.

15. William Bywater, "Who's in the Warehouse Now?", JAAC, volume 30, number 4, p.520.
16. Ibid., p.520.
17. Maurice Mandelbaum, "Family Resemblances And Generalization Concerning The Arts", reprinted in Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, op.cit., p.511.
18. Ibid., p.511.
19. Both of these examples are Mandelbaum's.
20. Maurice Mandelbaum, op.cit., p.503.
21. Ibid., p.504.
22. Ibid., p.506.
23. The issue may be more complicated, given certain concerns in philosophy of perception, but such complications need not be considered here.
24. G.E.M. Anscombe makes this distinction in terms of facts rather than properties. See "On Brute Facts", Anal, volume 18, number 3 (1958).
25. A similar analysis could be given "Jones killed Smith" and "Jones murdered Smith". Killing concerns brute facts, while murdering concerns institutional facts; murder evolved with certain social institutions, those of the legal system and the moral code.
26. The meaning of "brother" referred to is that of "male offspring with the same biological parents". Other meanings of "brother" may involve institutions. One example of this concerns the practice of adoption.
27. The number of possible combinations is 2^n , where n represents the number of distinctions.
28. The classes this eliminates is exhibited, non-relational, institutional properties and non-exhibited, non-relational, institutional properties.
29. The class that is eliminated is exhibited, relational, institutional properties.
30. This eliminates the non-exhibited, non-relational class. Such consideration would also eliminate a class which is already eliminated, non-exhibited, non-relational, institutional properties.

31. To summarize the discussion; there are eight possible combinations.

<u>Class</u>	<u>Example</u>
1. exhibited, relational, brute property	to the left of
2. exhibited, relational, institutional property	--
3. non-exhibited, relational, brute property	being a brother
4. non-exhibited, relational, institutional property	being married
5. exhibited, non-relational, brute property	being red
6. exhibited, non-relational, institutional property	--
7. non-exhibited, non-relational, brute property	--
8. non-exhibited, non-relational, institutional property	--

CHAPTER TWO

THE INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF ART

Given the unresolved nature of the situation in aesthetics, the work of Arthur Danto takes on special significance. Danto's importance here is largely a function of the fact that his work can be perceived as an extension of the work of Mandelbaum.

But telling artworks from other things is not so simple a matter, even for native speakers, and these days one might not be aware he was on artistic terrain without an artistic theory to tell him so.¹

Danto claims that one cannot "look and see" in order to determine membership in the class of art objects. Being a work of art cannot be understood as an exhibited property which objects possess. "To see something as art requires something the eye cannot decry--an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld."² On Danto's analysis, art is understood as involving a relational property which is institutional in nature. Such an account avoids the criticisms brought to bear against traditional aesthetics by advocates of the open concept theory such as Weitz.

Dickie, as he himself acknowledges, builds his theory on the insights of Mandelbaum and Danto. In addition, the work of the open concept theorists is considered significant.

The traditional attempts to define "art", from the imitation theory on, may be thought of as Phase I and the contention that "art" cannot be defined [in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions] as Phase II. I want to supply Phase III by defining "art" in such a way as to avoid the difficulties of the traditional definitions and to incorporate the insights of the later analysis.³

Weitz and others have provided a service to aesthetics through their criticism. While their criticism fails to establish the conclusion that

art is an open concept, it does force advocates of a closed concept analysis of art to re-evaluate their position. Responses to Weitz's arguments about creativity and the expanding nature of the class of art objects strongly suggest that there are limitations on the nature of the properties relevant to defining art. It is this potential difficulty that Dickie wishes to avoid. The work of Mandelbaum and Danto provides Dickie with the means of achieving this end.

Dickie offers three different accounts of art, each successive account being designed to avoid potential problems and clarify the notions. The first account is the following. "A work of art in the descriptive sense is (1) an artifact (2) upon which some society or some sub-group of a society has conferred the status of candidate for appreciation."⁴ Such an analysis of art differs significantly from many of the traditional theories of art; one cannot "look and see" whether an object is a work of art. Dickie offers a second formulation that differs from the first in two important ways. "A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) upon which some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld) has conferred the status of candidate for appreciation."⁵ The first way this formulation differs from the previous one is that it makes explicit reference to acting on behalf of a social institution. This change is designed to allow Dickie the opportunity of providing an adequate account of the conferral of status. The notion of institutions plays a key role in this account. Second, in the original formulation, Dickie is concerned with what he calls the descriptive sense of art. The later formulation concerns the classificatory sense of art. Dickie originally contended that there were two senses of "work of art", the evaluative and the descriptive, while in the second formulation he asserts that there are three, the evaluative, classificatory, and derivative. Dickie's third formulation is the following:

A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld).⁶

The difference between this formulation and the earlier accounts concerns what the status is conferred upon. In the earliest versions, it was the artifact itself, while in this account it is a "set of the aspects" of the artifact. This change is designed to allow Dickie to incorporate an account of the aesthetic object into his theory of art.

There are six notions of importance in Dickie's theory. The first is that of "artifact". The other five are "acting on behalf of an institution", "conferring the status", "being a candidate", "artworld", and "appreciation". Each of these notions requires attention in order to achieve a fuller understanding of Dickie's account. In this chapter, the notions will be explicated. Subsequent chapters will be devoted to critical examination.

The first of these notions requires only brief examination at present. It is a necessary condition for something's being a work of art that it be an artifact. Dickie considers this claim to be relatively uncontroversial.

It is now clear that artifactuality is a necessary condition (call it the genus) of the primary sense of art. This fact, however, does not seem very surprising and would not even be very interesting except that Weitz and others have denied it. Artifactuality alone, however, is not the whole story and another necessary condition (the differentia) has to be specified in order to have a satisfactory definition of "art".⁷

This other necessary condition is the second clause of Dickie's definition. It contains the other five notions that are important, and Dickie devotes much of his exposition to this clause and the notions in it.

Dickie discusses two of these notions together since he feels that they are too closely related to make separate discussions viable. These two notions are "conferring the status" and "acting on behalf of an institution". Much of the discussion comes in the form of examples.

The most clearcut examples of the conferring of status are certain legal actions of the state. A king's conferring of knighthood, a grand jury's indicting someone, the chairman of the election board certifying that someone is qualified to run for office, or a minister's pronouncing a couple man and wife are examples in which a person or persons acting on behalf of a social institution (the state) confer(s) legal status on persons. The congress or a legally constituted

commission may confer the status of national park or monument on an area or thing.⁸

Such examples make clear how the notions of "conferring" and "on behalf of an institution" are to function. The contention is that something analogous happens in the social institution governing art.

Dickie foresees two possible areas of concern with this analogy, and discusses them immediately.

The examples given suggest that pomp and ceremony are required to establish legal status, but this is not so, although of course a legal institution is presupposed. For example, in some jurisdictions common-law marriage is possible--a legal status acquired without ceremony. The conferring of a Ph.D. degree on someone by a university, the election of someone as president of the Rotary, and the declaring of an object as a relic of the church are examples in which a person or persons confer(s) nonlegal status on persons or things.⁹

While in many ways the conferred status of knighthood is different from the activities involving art, any differences that exist are non-essential. The notion of conferring can play the same role for the institutions of art that it does for those of the state.

Some may feel that the notion of conferring status within the artworld is excessively vague. Certainly this notion is not as clear-cut as the conferring of status within the legal system, where procedure and lines of authority are explicitly defined and incorporated into law. The counterparts in the artworld to specified procedures and lines of authority are nowhere codified, and the artworld carries on its business at the level of customary practice. Still ¹⁰ there is a practice and this defines a social institution.

Responses to two potential objections are made in these discussions.

First, Dickie denies the claim that conferring can only take place within a strictly governed institution. Second, he asserts that the artworld is in fact a social institution. Dickie explains what he means by an institution as follows:

Among the meanings of "institution" in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary are: "3. That which is instituted as: a. An established practice, law, custom, etc. b. An established society or corporation." When I call the artworld an institution I am saying it is an established practice. Some persons have thought that an institution must be an established society or corporation and, consequently, have misunderstood my claim about the artworld.¹¹

Thus, the artworld is a very loosely governed institution. It is this institution that provides the focal point for artistic activity, and art is produced by an act of conferring by someone on behalf of the institution.

In keeping with his discussion of a loosely governed institution, Dickie provides his account of what constitutes the artworld.

The core personnel of the artworld is a loosely organized, but nevertheless related, set of persons including artists (understood to refer to painters, writers, composers), producers, museum directors, museum-goers, theater-goers, reporters for newspapers, critics for publications of all sorts, art historians, art theorists, philosophers of art, and others. These are the people who keep the machinery of the artworld working and thereby provide for its continuing existence. In addition, every person who sees himself as a member of the artworld is thereby a member.¹²

Therefore, almost every member of society is a member of the artworld.

Dickie's theory of art, as discussed to this point, can be summarized in the following manner: A work of art (in the classificatory sense) is an artifact, a manmade object, that was produced within the context of the artworld.¹³ This object must have had conferred upon it a certain status by some person, or persons, who is a member of the group of individuals who are associated with art. This entails that art is a human activity that must be understood in a social, or cultural, context.

Two of the notions cited earlier have yet to be discussed. These are "being a candidate" and "appreciation". With respect to "being a candidate", Dickie follows a format that is analogous to much of his previous discussion. The example that Dickie relates the discussion to is "being a candidate for election". There are, according to Dickie, two important similarities between "being a candidate for appreciation" and "being a candidate for election". First, almost anyone can suggest that a person stand for election. A similar situation exists in the artworld since almost anyone can confer the status. Second, and more important, being a candidate for election does not entail that one will be elected, just as being a candidate for appreciation does not require that the object be appreciated. Dickie considers this to be an essential feature of his account.

It is important not to build into the definition of the classificatory sense of "work of art" value properties such as actual appreciation: to do so would make it impossible to speak of unappreciated works of art. Building in value properties might even make it awkward to speak of bad works of art. A theory of art must preserve certain central features of the way in which we talk about art, and we do find it necessary sometimes to speak of unappreciated art and of bad art.¹⁴

This leads directly to questions concerning Dickie's account of appreciation. It is the following: "All that is meant by 'appreciation' in the definition is something like 'in experiencing the qualities of a thing one finds them worthy or valuable', and this meaning applies quite generally both inside and outside the domain of art."¹⁵ Dickie denies that there is such a thing as aesthetic appreciation, distinct from other kinds of appreciation.

Dickie's denial that there is any special aesthetic appreciation is largely tied to his account of the aesthetic attitude and the aesthetic object. Dickie claims that there is no more a special aesthetic attitude than there is any special aesthetic appreciation.¹⁶ Given that the aesthetic attitude serves as a possible means of identifying the aesthetic object, questions arise concerning how the aesthetic object is determined. Dickie argues that there are governing conventions in the artworld relating to this matter.

A knowledgeable movie-goer knows what to attend to and what to ignore for the same reason that a spectator at traditional Chinese theatre knows to ignore the property man and to attend to the actors--they both have learned the conventions that govern the presentation and appreciation of the art forms they are experiencing.¹⁷

Understanding the aesthetic object in terms of conventions explains much of Dickie's rejection of the aesthetic attitude. There can be no such attitude since the conventions that exist are open to change. Changing conventions result in the actual aesthetic object's changing. If the aesthetic attitude defined the aesthetic object, then it would not be possible to provide an adequate account of such changes. The nature of the aesthetic attitude cannot remain constant while the aesthetic object

changes. Analogous considerations apply with respect to aesthetic appreciation. Given the lack of constraints that exist on objects which can become art through conferring, there cannot be unique aesthetic appreciation. Such appreciation would impose limits on the objects which could be viewed as art, and this is not compatible with Dickie's general view.

An account of the aesthetic object in terms of conventions can easily be incorporated into Dickie's analysis of art. Dickie's last formulation of the theory makes reference to "a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation". Dickie believes his analysis of the aesthetic object in terms of conventions fills out his analysis of art by providing an account of which aspects of the work of art have the status conferred upon them. The work of art is the artifact, and conventions govern which features of the artifact are to be appreciated.

The analysis of art that Dickie provides ties artworks to the artworld. A member of the artworld must confer a certain status on the object. Which elements of the object are involved in this conferring process are determined by institutional conventions. While Dickie's account of art has a certain plausibility, each of the important notions must be subject to critical examination before a final verdict can be reached.

CHAPTER TWO FOOTNOTES

1. Arthur Danto, "The Artistic Enfranchisement Of Real Objects", reprinted in Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, eds. George Dickie and Richard Sclafani (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p.23.
2. Ibid., p.29.
3. George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (London: Cornell University Press, 1974), p.20.
4. George Dickie, "Defining Art", APQ, July 1969, p.253.
5. George Dickie, Aesthetics: An Introduction (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971), p.101.
6. George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis, op.cit., p.34.
7. Ibid., p.27.
8. Ibid., p.34.
9. Ibid., p.34.
10. Ibid., p.35.
11. Ibid., p.31.
12. Ibid., p.35.
13. Dickie allows the possibility that an object may be created outside of the artworld, and later have the status conferred upon it. The ramifications of such a possibility will be critically examined in chapter six.
14. George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis, op.cit., p.40.
15. Ibid., p.40.

16. For a full discussion of this rejection see George Dickie's "The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude", APQ, volume 1, number 1, 1964, pp.56-66.
17. George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis, op.cit., p.172.

CHAPTER THREE

ARTIFACTS AND ARTIFACTUALITY

Dickie claims that there are two necessary conditions that any object must possess before it can be classified as a work of art. The first of these conditions appears to be very straightforward, and is simply that the object must be an "artifact". However, given Dickie's account of artifactuality as a non-exhibited characteristic, the issues involved are more complicated than they at first appear.

Douglas Stalker's discussion of artifactuality provides an appropriate means for the introduction of some of the complexities of the issue. Stalker's account involves the claim that artifactuality is an exhibited characteristic. He suggests that if artifactuality is a non-exhibited characteristic, then "with respect to being artifacts, a Rodin and a leaf should be hard to tell apart, just from their looks."¹ Stalker claims that this is clearly not the case, asserting:

In fact, it's easy to perceive that tons of things are artifacts or not. My typewriter is, my thermos is, the desk is, the book to my right, the light overhead, the ashtray; the oak outside isn't, the ants aren't, nor are the weeds, the clouds, etc. What's the problem? Certainly there are some borderline cases, but the same goes for being baby blue. Being an artifact, then, doesn't seem to be a non-exhibited characteristic.²

This serves to raise questions about exactly what is involved in the notion of artifactuality. Stated simply, the notion seems to require that it be understood in terms of being man-made. Such an understanding, however, does little to illuminate the issue. Being man-made and being an artifact give rise to exactly the same questions. The dispute remains. Stalker seems to feel that his account entails that artifactuality be understood as an exhibited property. Dickie contends that it be under-

stood as a non-exhibited property. While the account that Stalker proposes has some initial plausibility, it fails to stand up under examination.

Stalker must address the question of how one knows a thermos is an artifact, while the oak outside is not. If artifactuality can be understood as an exhibited property, then the only knowledge that one would antecedently require would be knowledge of the meaning of the concept. Consider the example of the property "red". One can examine an object and immediately come to the conclusion that it either has or does not have this characteristic. There is no requirement of antecedent knowledge for one to make the determination. One can look at the object and reason deductively to the conclusion that the object has the given property. This, however, does not seem to be the case with artifactuality. One can know that artifactuality concerns the notion of having been produced by a human being without being able to tell which objects are artifacts and which are not. In order to acquire knowledge of artifacts that is of an analogous nature to knowledge concerning "red", one requires knowledge of the causal history of the object. This knowledge would have to include such things as an understanding of the origins of the object, how the object came to be where it is, and what relations exist between the object and people. This type of consideration provides some of the reasoning behind Dickie's claim, in his response to Stalker, that, "My main point was that artifactuality is a complicated, cultural property."³ Artifactuality involves a complicated property. Being an artifact is such that it involves non-exhibited characteristics and relations. Dickie seems to have a proper understanding of the type of property that artifactuality involves, while it appears that Stalker does not.

Even granting that Dickie seems to have a proper understanding of the type of property that artifactuality involves, certain questions remain. In particular, questions concerning the claim that artifactuality is a necessary condition for art remain unaddressed. Evidence that artifactuality is not a necessary condition for art appears in two distinct areas. One, natural objects, in their original environment, are some-

times referred to as works of art. Two, objects are sometimes transported from their natural settings, and then referred to as works of art. An example of the former is a piece of wood on the beach, while a case of the latter is a piece of driftwood hanging on a person's wall. In order to establish that artifactuality is a necessary condition for art, Dickie needs to offer appropriate accounts of these instances. Thus, Dickie must establish two distinct claims. If something is a natural object, then it is not art. If something is art, then it is an artifact. The falsity of either of these claims will demonstrate that artifactuality is not a necessary condition for art. The first claim relates to natural objects in their natural setting, and Dickie addresses this concern with a discussion of the different senses of "work of art". The second claim concerns natural objects removed from their natural setting, and it is discussed by means of the notion of "conferring artifactuality". These two discussions require separate examinations.

Dickie wishes to maintain the artifactuality condition as a necessary condition for an object's being a work of art. He attempts to establish that claims that a natural object can be a work of art fail to take into account that there are different senses of "work of art".

Most people assume that there is a sharp distinction between works of art and natural objects, but Weitz has argued that the fact that we sometimes say of natural objects that they are works of art breaks down this distinction. In short, there appear to be works of art which are not artifacts. However, Weitz's argument is inconclusive because he fails to take account of the two senses of "work of art"--the evaluative and classificatory.⁴

Dickie asserts that there are two senses of "work of art". The evaluative sense, according to Dickie, is used to praise an object. When one asserts, "That painting is a work of art", one means to be claiming the painting has valuable qualities. Dickie argues that this is the only intelligible way to understand such a statement, since, if one tries to understand "work of art" in the classificatory sense, it would be a tautology. The information that the object is a work of art, in the classificatory sense, is already contained in the concept of "painting". The evaluative sense of "work of art" is not restricted to objects which are

"works of art" in the classificatory sense. Dickie suggests that utterances such as, "That piece of driftwood is a work of art", can be given a similar analysis. When one makes such a statement one is claiming the driftwood has valuable qualities; one is not claiming the piece of driftwood is a work of art in the classificatory sense.

It is clear, however, that all Dickie has done is offer an alternative analysis of certain utterances about natural objects. Dickie has not proven that it is wrong to claim artifactuality is not a necessary condition for art. All that Dickie has shown is that Weitz and other advocates of positions that deny the artifactuality condition have failed to establish their conclusion. The question about the necessity of the artifactuality condition remains open.

In order to develop an additional argument to demonstrate that artifactuality is a necessary condition for art, Dickie attempts to establish that there is yet another sense of "work of art". Dickie credits Richard Sclafani with realizing that there are three senses.⁵

Sclafani shows that there is a third sense of "work of art" and that "driftwood cases" (the nonartifact cases) fall under it....There are then at least three distinct senses of "work of art": the primary or classificatory sense, the secondary or derivative, and the evaluative.⁶

Dickie preserves his two original senses of art. The primary sense remains the one by which one makes clear that something is a work of art. Dickie claims this sense is rarely used.

We are rarely in situations in which it is necessary to raise the question whether or not an object is a work of art.... However, recent developments in art such as junk sculpture and found art may occasionally force such remarks.⁷

The evaluative sense of art remains the sense that is used to praise an object. The third sense that is added is the secondary, or derivative, sense of "work of art". Dickie explicates the secondary sense of art by discussing how Sclafani explains this notion.

He [Sclafani] begins by comparing a paradigm work of art, Brancusi's Bird in Space, with a piece of driftwood which looks very much like it. Sclafani says that it is natural to say of the piece of driftwood that it is a work of art and we do so because it has many properties in common with the Brancusi piece. He then asks us to reflect on our

characterization of the driftwood and the direction it has taken.⁸

Therefore, according to Dickie, it is possible for a natural object to become a work of art if it has enough properties in common with paradigm cases of works of art.

At first glance, such an account seems to reflect the general view that is forwarded by Weitz and others in the advocacy of the open concept theory of art. However, Dickie clarifies his view, and claims his account is very different from the open concept theory.

We say the driftwood is art because of its resemblances to some paradigm work of art or because the object shares properties with several paradigm works of art. The paradigm work or works are always artifacts; the direction of our move is from paradigmatic (artifactual) works of art to non-artifactual "art". Sclafani quite correctly takes this to indicate that there is a primary, paradigmatic sense of "work of art" (my classificatory sense) and a derivative or secondary sense into which the "driftwood cases" fall. Weitz is right in a way in saying that the driftwood is art, but wrong in concluding that artifactuality is unnecessary for (the primary sense of) art.⁹

There remain important differences between Dickie's view and that of advocates of the open concept theory. Dickie wishes to understand art, in the primary sense, in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Advocates of the open concept theory analyse art solely on the basis of similarities and resemblances.

Has Dickie provided an adequate response to individuals who claim that natural objects can be works of art? It is clear that he has not. Just as when Dickie argues for two senses of "work of art", he has failed to provide anything other than an alternative account. In addition, in claiming that all non-artifact art must concern the secondary sense of "work of art", Dickie begs the question. This is reflected in any attempt to determine which utterances of "work of art" involve the classificatory sense and which involve the secondary sense. Consider the following: One claims that it is a necessary condition for art that the object be a representation of some object in the physical world; another individual denies this claim. In order to support the claim, one asserts that there is a distinction between the classificatory sense of "work of

art" and the secondary sense. All cases of non-representative art concern the secondary sense. Clearly, such a response is guilty of analysing the empirical data with the theory in mind. The basis for the claim that all non-representative art is art in the secondary sense is the fact that one has already decided that a necessary condition for art is that it be representational. This is simply a case of begging the question. The introduction of the senses of "work of art" only serves to rationalize the position that has been antecedently decided upon.

Similarly, Dickie is guilty of begging the question. How does Dickie determine which art is art in the classificatory sense and which is art in the secondary sense? He makes no attempt to explicate a procedure for such decisions. All that is provided are claims about the "direction" art has taken, and the "resemblance" to paradigms of art. Even granting that the secondary sense of "work of art" exists, Dickie has provided no independent argument to demonstrate that all non-artifact art involves this sense. His justification rests solely on his claim that artifactuality is a necessary condition for art. Thus, he has simply begged the question as to whether or not natural objects can be art in the classificatory sense.

In addition, Dickie's discussion seems to provide evidence for the claim that art is an open concept. If one approaches the empirical data with no prior decision on the artifactuality question, then Dickie's discussion of "resemblances to paradigms" and the "direction" in which art has moved provides evidence to support the position advocated by open concept theorists. Open concept theorists claim art must be understood in just such a fashion. Dickie's attempt to deal with the possibility of natural objects being works of art only serves to beg the question and provide evidence that art may be an open concept.

The second class of objects that Dickie considers is that of natural objects which one takes home and displays in a fashion identical to the way one displays works of art. Dickie views this class as presenting concerns distinct from those presented by natural objects in their original setting.

I was assuming earlier, by the way, that the piece of driftwood referred to in Weitz's sentence was in place on a beach and was untouched by human hand or at least untouched by

human intention and therefore was art in the evaluative or derivative sense.¹⁰

Dickie wishes to maintain that natural objects which one carries home are works of art in the classificatory sense. This entails that they must be artifacts.

The requirement of artifactuality for such objects requires that Dickie offer a special account of artifactuality for these cases. The usual account of artifactuality in terms of a human being's making an object does not seem adequate. One claim is particularly important to understanding Dickie's special account of artifactuality. "Natural objects which become works of art in the way being discussed are artifactualized without the use of tools--the artifactuality is conferred on the object rather than worked on it."¹¹ Dickie has in mind cases such as picking up a natural object, a rock or a piece of driftwood, taking that object home, and displaying it on one's wall or mantle. On such an account, it seems easy to produce artifacts. Such impression is reinforced by Dickie.

The requirement of artifactuality cannot prevent creativity since artifactuality is a necessary condition of creativity. There cannot be an instance of creativity without an artifact of some kind being produced.¹²

This raises questions about Dickie's special account of artifactuality. To claim that any instance of creativity, even creative selection or conferral, results in the production of an artifact seems to be too strong a claim. Dickie's account seems to make the production of artifacts too easy.

Daniel Devereux offers criticism of Dickie's special account of artifactuality on the grounds that it allows too little creativity, and creativity of the wrong kind, to result in the creation of artifacts. Devereux raises his concerns through the means of potential counter-examples.

(1) Suppose I am out in the woods looking for a fern to take home with me. I find a rather attractive one and transplant it to a pot. When I get home I hang the pot in the living room in a place which will show off the plant to best advantage. I wish to display it for basically the same reason I would a beautiful picture. On Dickie's view we must say that

the fern is no longer a natural object, but that it has been transformed into an artifact.

(2) Presumably it is not essential to the process of transformation that the object be put on display inside a building. Suppose I buy a tree from a nursery and carefully choose a place in my front yard to plant it. My reasons for choosing this particular tree, and this particular place for it are chiefly aesthetic. Does the tree, once planted, become an artifact? Does it cease to be a natural object?¹³

Devereux's counter-examples focus on the notion of creativity. The second example discussed suggests that there are constraints on creativity and the production of artifacts. The planting of the tree in a specific location involves an act of creativity. However, the result is a natural object and not an artifact. The first example is of the same nature. Acts of creativity, which in the case of the fern involve choice, are not sufficient for the production of an artifact. These examples are designed to demonstrate that not every act of creativity results in the production of an artifact. Devereux goes on to claim that making artifacts requires that some internal change occur in the object; one must do something to the object, and not just with the object. This suggests that one cannot "confer" artifactuality. Something more is required.

In response to such criticism, Dickie admits that the notion of conferring artifactuality is inadequate. He asserts:

I agree with Stalker and a number of other people who have raised the criticism that it was a mistake for me to have spoken of artifactuality being conferred. I also now think it was a mistake to have said that "picking up and toting" counts as conferring artifactuality; it is rather a way of achieving artifactuality.¹⁴

Dickie admits that the making of an artifact requires more than simply conferring the status of artifactuality. Artifactuality concerns a property which objects possess by virtue of being the product of deliberate human manipulation. Conferring does not entail that such manipulation occurs. By denying that "picking up and toting" results in a conferred artifactuality, Dickie acknowledges that artifactuality involves a state that is achieved through certain activity. The question remains whether or not "picking up and toting" results in sufficient manipulation for the achieving of an artifact. Given Devereux's point about internal

change, it appears that such manipulation will fail to result in an artifact.

The main reason for Dickie's difficulty is demonstrated by possible answers to the question, "Is it possible for a natural object to become a work of art?". Dickie's need for conferring, or achieving, artifactuality in the contested manner can be illustrated by contrasting Dickie's position with those of Stalker and Devereux. Stalker accepts that a natural object can become a work of art, but he denies that artifactuality is a necessary condition for art. Devereux accepts that artifactuality is a necessary condition for art, but denies that a natural object can become a work of art. Dickie desires to hold a position that accepts artifactuality as a necessary condition for art, but also allows the possibility that a natural object can become a work of art. This places Dickie in the position of having to forward, what he acknowledges to be, an unusual account of artifactuality.

As suggested by the counter-examples, Dickie seems to be committed to an incorrect analysis of the logical structure of the concept of artifactuality. This is manifest in his attempt to respond to a criticism by Stalker concerning the possibility of something's being both an artifact and a natural object.

Stalker regards this as a quandary because the same thing is both an artifact and a natural object. But I do not see that there is any puzzle here. The boulder is a natural object with respect to the interest of the collector and is an artifact with respect to the artworld. A carved walnut statue is both an artifact and a specimen of walnut.¹⁵

Dickie offers an analysis of artifactuality which is analogous in logical structure to the analysis of brother. Both artifactuality and brother are non-exhibited relational properties. However, not all such properties have the same form. Being a brother is a property which an individual acquires by standing in a certain relation with another individual. It does not follow, however, that if one stands in the being-a-brother relation with some individuals, then one stands in such a relation with all individuals. One can be a brother to some individuals and not others.

An example of a non-exhibited, relational characteristic that does not have the same logical structure as being a brother is fossilhood. Fossilhood must be understood as a non-exhibited, relational property.

It is relational because the possession of this property requires that the object have a specified origin. Fossilhood is non-exhibited because it is possible that two objects are qualitatively identical, yet only one is a fossil. One may have been produced in a laboratory and, thereby, fail to have the required origin. No object can both be a fossil and a non-fossil. It is possible that one person may view an object as a fossil and another may not, but one individual must be wrong. This is different from the situation with respect to brother. One person can stand in the relation of being a brother with an individual, while another may not. Fossilhood and artifactuality are analogous to the extent that whether or not an object has this property rests on the relation between the object and its origins. Being a brother is different in that whether or not being a brother is a property that exists depends on the viewer's relation to the object. Therefore, Dickie is wrong to claim that an object can be an artifact for one individual, while being a natural object for another. Dickie's attempt to eliminate the evidence that is designed to show that artifactuality is not a necessary condition for art is a failure. His introduction of three senses of "work of art" to deal with natural objects in their original surroundings begs the question, and his special account of artifactuality commits Dickie to an improper understanding of artifactuality.

Insight into what leads Dickie to forward his special account of artifactuality is present in the work of Devereux. In a footnote Devereux says:

One could perhaps consider the driftwood together with the wall as a composition of art. But in this case the driftwood would only be a part of a work of art; it would not itself be a work of art.¹⁶

A similar comment could be forwarded with respect to artifactuality. A piece of driftwood, or any natural object, cannot have artifactuality "conferred" upon it; nor is it enough to "achieve" artifactuality if one simply picks up a natural object and carries it home. However, if one hangs a piece of driftwood on the wall and places a picture frame around it, then the driftwood becomes part of an artifact. This artifact would be composed of the frame and the driftwood, and, perhaps even, the wall. It is possible that confusion as to the ontological status of the new

artifact is what leads Dickie to offer a special account of artifactuality.¹⁷ One person may view the driftwood as a natural object. Another may see it as an artifact, or, to be more precise, as part of the new artifact that has been produced; and the driftwood can be both of these at the same time.

This alternative account is clearly superior to the analysis that is provided by Dickie. Dickie's special account of artifactuality commits him to an improper understanding of the logical structure of artifactuality. The alternative analysis is consistent with the proper analysis of the structure of artifactuality. In addition, it also requires that producing an artifact involves, as Devereux suggests, bringing about an internal change in an object that results in the creation of some new, or different, object. Such an analysis takes into account the notions that are normally associated with artifactuality. If Dickie wishes to deny the alternative account, then the onus is on him to show where it fails, as well as providing an adequate defense of his own analysis. Such a defense seems unlikely since Dickie's analysis involves problems concerning the logical structure of artifactuality.

Dickie claims that artifactuality is a necessary condition for art. In order to support this claim, Dickie discusses two classes of objects which seem to suggest that this claim is false. People sometimes speak of natural objects as being works of art. Dickie argues that this does not offer evidence against his claim by introducing different senses of "work of art". As has been shown, this only serves to beg the question. The second area Dickie discusses concerns natural objects removed from their natural environments and treated as works of art. A special account of artifactuality is offered to show that such objects are really artifacts. Such an account is based on an improper analysis of the logical structure of artifactuality. In addition, counter-examples exist that demonstrate this account's inadequacy. Dickie has failed to offer an adequate response to either of the objections he raises against his own view. Therefore, the question as to whether or not artifactuality is a necessary condition for art remains open.

CHAPTER THREE FOOTNOTES

1. Douglas Stalker, "The Importance of Being an Artifact", Phil 8-4, Oct. 79, p.705.
2. Ibid., p.705.
3. George Dickie, "An Earnest Reply To Professor Stalker", Phil 8-4, Oct. 79, p.713.
4. George Dickie, Aesthetics: An Introduction (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971), p.98.
5. For Sclafani's discussion see Richard Sclafani's "'Art" and Artifactuality", SWJP, 1-3, 1970.
6. George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (London: Cornell University Press, 1974), p.25.
7. George Dickie, Aesthetics: An Introduction, op.cit., p.99.
8. George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis, op.cit., p.25.
9. Ibid., p.25.
10. Ibid., p.44.
11. Ibid., p.44.
12. Ibid., p.48.
13. Daniel Devereux, "Artifacts, Natural Objects, And Works Of Art", Anal, 37.3, March 77, p.134.
14. George Dickie, "An Earnest Reply to Professor Stalker", op.cit., p.713.
15. Ibid., p.714.
16. Daniel Devereux, op.cit., p.136.
17. This possibility is considered in fuller detail in chapter six.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONFERRING ON BEHALF OF THE ARTWORLD

Given the conclusion reached with respect to artifactuality, it becomes important that Dickie's second necessary condition for art be examined. The second necessary condition that Dickie proposes is "a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld)."¹ As previously stated, there are five important notions within this condition. In this chapter, three of these notions will be examined. They are "conferring", "on behalf of a certain social institution", and "the artworld".

According to Dickie, the notions of "conferring" and "on behalf of a certain social institution" are connected in such a fashion that they must be discussed together. Much of the discussion takes the form of the presentation of examples.

The most clearcut examples of the conferring of status are certain legal actions of the state. A king's conferring of knighthood, a grand jury's indicting someone, the chairman of the election board certifying that someone is qualified to run for office, or a minister's pronouncing a couple man and wife are examples in which a person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the state) confer(s) legal status on persons. The congress may confer the status of national park or monument on an area or thing.²

Such examples make clear what Dickie has in mind by the notions of "conferring" and "on behalf of a certain social institution". Consider the example of a grand jury's indicting someone. The grand jury is associated with society's legal institution. When the jury follows procedures that exist within the legal institution, it is proper to view the jury as acting on behalf of the legal institution. In following a given proce-

ture, a certain result is obtained. In the case in question, the jury will have conferred the status of being indicted on a given individual.

Dickie contends that an analogous situation exists with respect to art. The social institution that the artist is associated with is the artworld. According to Dickie, the artist serves the same function within the artworld that the grand jury serves within the legal world. The artist, by performing some action, achieves an end that is analogous with conferring the status of being indicted on an individual in the legal world. The status, in the artworld, is that of being a candidate for appreciation.

Dickie immediately attends to what he perceives to be two possible objections to this analogy.

The examples given suggest that pomp and ceremony are required to establish legal status, but this is not so, although of course a legal system is presupposed. For example, in some jurisdictions common-law marriage is possible--a legal status acquired without ceremony.³

One can immediately see why Dickie feels it is important to establish this point. If all conferring, for example, in the legal world requires explicit conferring activity, then it is difficult to perceive how it is possible for an analogy between the legal world and artworld to be maintained. The production of art objects does not seem to involve any explicit conferring process. Therefore, it is necessary for Dickie to establish that some legal conferring does not involve explicit conferring.

Dickie considers a second objection to his attempt to establish an analogy between the legal world and the artworld. This objection is two-fold. First, it is not clear that the artworld can even be understood in terms of a social institution. Second, even granting that the artworld is an institution, the dissimilarities between the artworld and the legal world are such that any attempt to establish an analogy between the two is ill-founded. Dickie's response to the first component of this objection involves an account of what constitutes a social institution, and how the artworld fulfills this criterion.

Let me make clear what I mean by speaking of the artworld as an institution. Among the meanings of "institution" in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary are the following: "3. That which is instituted as: a. An established practise, law,

custom, etc. b. An established society or corporation." When I call the artworld an institution I am saying that it is an established practise. Some persons have thought that an institution must be an established society or corporation and, consequently, have misunderstood my claim about the artworld.⁴

If one allows an established practice to count as an institution, then the artworld will constitute an institution. The production of art has been practiced for centuries and the artworld seems, at least on the surface, to have a long interconnected history that can be traced. The artworld involves the efforts of artists, spectators, and critics who have a designated role. All of these features seem to combine to allow the artworld to be considered an established practice and, thereby, an institution.⁵

Given that the artworld is an institution, Dickie must still face the second component of the objection. Since the artworld and the legal world seem to qualify as institutions in very different ways, it is even less clear how any analogy between them is appropriate. Dickie's choice of the legal world may be untenable; another example of conferring may be required.⁶ However, Dickie defends his choice of the legal world as an example, and discusses one important dissimilarity between the artworld and the legal world in order to demonstrate that his analogy is sound. The dissimilarity that Dickie discusses concerns the fact that it is possible to fail to confer a given status in the legal world, while this possibility does not seem to exist in the artworld.

Some may find it strange that in the nonart cases discussed, there are ways in which the conferring can go wrong, while that does not appear to be true in art. For example, an indictment might be improperly drawn up and the person charged would not actually be indicted, but nothing parallel seems possible in the case of art.⁷

Dickie does not present any account of how conferring cannot fail in the artworld. However, he contends that the dissimilarity fails to undercut the appropriateness of his analogy, since this dissimilarity only reflects a difference between the legal world and the artworld that is not significant to his overall account.

This fact just reflects the differences between the artworld and legal institutions: the legal system deals with matters

of grave personal consequences and its procedures must reflect this; the artworld deals with important matters also but they are of a different sort entirely. The artworld does not require rigid procedures; it admits and even encourages frivolity and caprice without losing its serious purpose.⁸

The differences between the two institutions, according to Dickie, are not significant with respect to the issues that Dickie deems important. The differences are not important with respect to the mechanisms of conferring and acting on behalf of the institutions, and it is these features which Dickie wishes to maintain are analogous between the legal world and the artworld.

In order to fill out the analogy between the legal world and the artworld, Dickie presents, what he perceives to be, the actual composition of the artworld.

The core personnel of the artworld is a loosely organized, but nevertheless related, set of persons including artists (understood to refer to painters, writers, composers), producers, museum directors, museum-goers, theatre-goers, reporters for newspapers, critics for publications of all sorts, art historians, art theorists, philosophers of art, and others. These are the people who keep the machinery of the artworld working and thereby provide for its continuing existence. In addition, every person who sees himself as a member of the artworld is thereby a member.⁹

Such an account of the composition of the artworld appears to strengthen Dickie's analogy between the legal world and the artworld. The core personnel of the artworld seems to correspond to judges, lawyers, and juries in the legal world. Such individuals serve to guarantee the continued existence of the legal institutions. In addition, each person can perceive himself to be a member of the legal world to the extent that one needs to obey the laws established within the context of the legal world. Both the artworld and the legal world seem to involve individuals who play roles that are essential to the continued existence of the institutions, as well as having memberships that are broadly based.

At this point, some of the key notions of Dickie's definition and the analogies that he uses to explain and justify the notions will be examined in light of some criticisms. The first notion that will be examined is that of "conferring". It is not really clear how conferring

actually functions in the artworld. Dickie offers little in the way of clarification.

Assuming that the existence of the artworld has been established or at least made plausible, the problem is now to see how status is conferred by this institution. My thesis is that, in a way analogous to the way in which a person is certified as qualified for office, or two persons acquire the status of common-law marriage within a legal system, or a person acquires the status of wise man within a community, so an artifact can acquire the status of candidate for appreciation within the social system called the "artworld".¹⁰

This amounts to little more than a restatement of the examples that Dickie previously mentioned; the only change is some additional examples. A variety of questions remain.¹¹

One such question concerns who can confer the status of candidate for appreciation. Dickie claims only one person is required, and that any individual who perceives himself as a member of the artworld can confer the status.

Many works of art are never seen by anyone but the persons who create them, but they are still works of art. The status in question may be acquired by a single person's treating an artifact as a candidate for appreciation. Of course nothing prevents a group of persons conferring the status, but it is usually conferred by a single person, the artist who creates the artifact.¹²

Such an account is problematic. It would follow from this account that anytime an artist thinks he has created a work he has been successful.¹³ Two other concerns become apparent immediately. First, there seems to be tension between Dickie's claim that almost anyone can confer the status and the actual functioning of the artworld.¹⁴ Second, by advocating the position that he does, Dickie has eliminated the importance of creativity in the artistic process. These concerns will be examined individually.

The tension between the claim that almost anyone can confer the status and the functioning of the artworld can be best understood in terms of an examination of a specific situation. The consequence of Dickie's view is that the following situation could not arise. An individual who perceives himself to be a member of the artworld creates an object. This individual decides that it is a great work of art and takes it to an art gallery.¹⁵ The art gallery refuses to show the object on the grounds

that it is not art. On the version of the institutional theory of art that Dickie proposes, such a description could not be correct. Since anyone can confer the status, and the artist has, the object must be a work of art. Therefore, the rejection of the object by the gallery cannot rest on the fact that the object is not art. On Dickie's view, the claim would have to be that the gallery refused to show the object because it was considered bad art. While such a claim may be plausible in some cases, it seems dubious that such a description is always correct.¹⁶

In addition, Dickie's account seems problematic when the relationship between conferring and artistic creativity is considered. Traditional aesthetics has been criticized, by Weitz and others, on the grounds that it forecloses creativity in art. The claim is presented in the following manner. Suppose that X is considered to be a necessary condition for art. If, and when, artists produce objects that fail to have quality X, then these artists will no longer be producing art. Dickie views it as one of the strengths of his theory that it is not open to this criticism. By defining art in terms of a non-exhibited, relational property Dickie contends that he has placed no constraints on the objects that artists can produce, and, thereby, no restrictions on artistic creativity.

The requirement of artifactuality cannot prevent creativity, since artifactuality is a necessary condition of creativity. There cannot be an instance of creativity without an artifact of some kind being produced. The second requirement involving the conferring of status could not inhibit creativity; in fact, it encourages it. Since under the definition anything whatever may become art, the definition imposes no restraints on creativity.¹⁷

It is clear that Dickie's theory has avoided the potential objection that has been raised against traditional aesthetics. The objection claims that an essentialist definition of art limits the range of objects permissible within the category of art, and, thereby, limits artistic creativity. Dickie's definition places no restrictions on the range of potential art objects.

Questions concerning creativity, however, are not restricted to those concerning the possible objects of artistic creation. There are questions that relate to the creative process by which objects are pro-

duced. This has been considered the important, if not essential, activity of artists, and Dickie fails to appreciate that his theory leaves little room for creativity in the artistic process. Michael Mitias makes such a point.

But Dickie does not at all explain how or in what sense a person who confers artistic status is creative. The fact that anything may become art does not necessarily encourage creativity; for conferring artistic status on an object does not imply that the object was creatively made. It only asserts that the object has somehow become a work of art. It is generally understood that the phenomenon of creativity is obtained when the artist struggles to produce through his medium--lines, colors, words, marble, motion, etc.--a unique aesthetic form; but in the act of conferring artistic status there is hardly any room for creativity, for the person who administers the act does not materially contribute anything to the object.¹⁸

The separation of the artistic process and the making of art within the context of Dickie's theory leads to the problem Mitias describes with respect to creativity. Dickie has eliminated any necessary connection between artistic creativity and art-making. Given that these two have traditionally been viewed as conceptually related, Dickie needs to offer more discussion and argument before such a view can be acceptable.¹⁹

The separation of artistic creativity and art-making leads to some unusual consequences. One such consequence is clearly manifest in Dickie's discussion of whether Betsy, a chimpanzee from the Baltimore Zoo, can produce art.

A great deal depends upon the institutional setting: one institutional setting is congenial to conferring the status of art and the other is not. Please note that although paintings such as Betsy's would remain her paintings even if exhibited in an art museum, they would be the art of the person responsible for their being exhibited. Betsy would not (I assume) be able to conceive of herself in such a way as to be a member of the artworld and, hence, would not be able to confer the relevant status.²⁰

In addition to the issue of creativity, there are at least two other points of importance here. One, Dickie explicitly speaks of conferring the status of art. This is a further indicator that Dickie views art-making as an activity of conferring, and not of producing. Two, Dickie claims that Betsy cannot produce art because she cannot perceive herself

as a member of the artworld. Such an account will make it difficult for Dickie to give an account of a small child's painting as being his own art, since young children will be in no better position than Betsy with respect to seeing themselves as members of the artworld. In addition, Dickie's account immediately leads to questions concerning individuals who do not, as opposed to cannot, perceive themselves as members of the artworld. For example, if an individual leads the life of a hermit, and does not perceive himself as a member of any of society's institutions, then that individual cannot produce art.²¹ The problem is further complicated if another individual takes the hermit's paintings and places them in an art gallery. The paintings are now art, but Dickie needs to maintain in this case, as he must in the case of Betsy, that the artist is the person who places them in the gallery, and not the hermit. If Dickie wishes to claim that the hermit is the artist, then he has expanded the notion of the artworld to incorporate all, or almost all, of humanity. The notion then becomes vacuous and has no explanatory power.

Part of Dickie's difficulty with "conferring" may be traced to the notion of "acting on behalf of the artworld". Jay Bachrach makes this point.

A university president will act in behalf of his school, a judge will act in behalf of the law, but how does the artist act in behalf of the artworld? Perhaps when, as critic, he promulgates a manifesto. But in presenting a work he does not act in behalf of anyone but himself unless he is acting as the representative of a school of art, a movement, or an academy, in short, some institution in the narrower, more clear-cut sense of that term, not the kind that Dickie says the artworld is.²²

While it makes sense to speak of the jury acting on behalf of the legal world, it does not seem to make sense to speak of the artist in the same fashion. Even granting that both are fulfilling designated roles, it does not follow that both are acting on behalf of their respective institutions. Consider an individual who is summoned to court over a minor offense. This individual's actions in court are not best described as actions on behalf of the legal world, but rather the actions are best described as actions on behalf of the individual. The individual in court

is not acting on behalf of the legal world, but he is acting in the legal world. A similar situation seems to occur with respect to artists. An artist does not act on behalf of the artworld, in a way a gallery director may act on behalf of a museum. The artist acts on his own behalf in the artworld. This raises two important points. Dickie has described the relationship between the artist and the artworld improperly in describing the relationship in terms of "on behalf of". Second, if conferring in the legal world is in terms that concern "on behalf of", and the artworld and its conferring must be understood in terms of "in", it is even less clear how Dickie's analogy between the legal world and the artworld can function.

The current chapter has focussed on three notions. These are "conferring", "acting on behalf of", and "the artworld". Conferring has been criticized in two areas. One, it eliminates the place of creativity in the process of artistic creativity. Two, Dickie does not, and apparently cannot, provide an adequate account of who can confer the status. This leads directly to questions about the artworld. Dickie's artworld, by including almost every person in society, is such a loose, wide-open notion that it fails to have any explanatory power. The last notion, "on behalf of", has been questioned on the grounds of accuracy. Artists do not produce art on behalf of the artworld, but rather in the context of the artworld.²³ Dickie's account of art, while plausible on the surface, seems to have inherent problems concerning some of the central notions.²⁴ Two important notions have yet to be examined. These two notions are "candidate for" and "appreciation", and these notions will be the subject of examination in chapter five.

CHAPTER FOUR FOOTNOTES

1. George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), p.34.
2. Ibid., p.34.
3. Ibid., p.34.
4. Ibid., p.31.
5. One of the first individuals to discuss the notion of the art-world was Arthur Danto. See "The Artworld", JP, Oct.15, 1964, pp.571-84. Dickie acknowledges that his works builds on, what he perceives to be, the insights of Danto.
6. Dickie does offer other examples. These examples are presented later in this chapter.
7. George Dickie, op.cit., p.49.
8. Ibid., p.49.
9. Ibid., p.35.
10. Ibid., p.37.
11. These questions fall into two distinct but related categories. The first category concerns problems with the actual notion of conferring. The second category concerns the relationship between conferring and Dickie's overall view. This chapter focuses on questions of the second category. Much of the discussion of Cohen's objections to "candidate for appreciation" in chapter five, and Silvers' discussion of the composition of certain works of art in chapter six bears directly on the actual notion of conferring, and the examples Dickie presents. The only example that is completely ignored is that of acquiring the status of wise man within a community. A small amount of reflection demonstrates the unacceptability of this example as the model for conferring in the artworld. Arguments about whether any individual is wise can occur. Such is not the case with respect to art; some objects are works of art without question. The only dispute concerns whether or not these

objects are good works of art. The conferring of the status of wise man does not entail that someone is actually wise, while the conferring of status, on Dickie's view, does entail that the object is art. Such differences reflect the fact that it makes more sense to speak of an individual as having a reputation of being a wise man, not the status of wise man. It makes no sense to speak of an object having a reputation of being a work of art.

12. George Dickie, Aesthetics: An Introduction (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971), p.103.
13. It may be objected that "thinking" is not "conferring the status". However, on Dickie's view, conferring is an implicit activity. It requires no special physical or mental activity. Given that conferring in the artworld is understood solely in terms of the institutional setting, thinking in that setting is sufficient for conferring the status. This issue is analogous to "conferring" and "placing before", and is discussed in chapter five.
14. The only restriction is that one must be a member of the artworld. Seeing oneself as a member (going to museums, reading art books, etc.) is sufficient for being a member of the artworld. Therefore, almost anyone can confer the status.
15. The relationship between "decides" and "conferring the status" is the same as between "thinking" and "conferring the status".
16. Dickie does have the option of claiming that the object is art with respect to some individual's interests, while not being art with respect to others' interests. This type of account was presented with respect to artifactuality. The arguments forwarded against the artifactuality account in chapter three also apply to the situation involving art. Such an account violates the logic of the concept.
17. George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis, op.cit., p.48.
18. Michael Mitias, "Art as a Social Institution", Per. 54-3, Summer 1975, p.332.
19. It is not clear, however, that Dickie has seen that a problem exists. This issue is discussed in detail in chapter six.
20. George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis, op.cit., p.46.
21. Dickie may claim that one is a member of the artworld without con-

ceiving oneself as such, provided that one could conceive oneself as a member. This still leaves questions about the small child, and how one can be acting on behalf of an institution that one does not acknowledge membership in.

22. Jay Bachrach, "Dickie's Institutional Theory of Art: Further Criticism", JAE, 11, Oct. 1977, p.29.
23. Even this claim may be too strong. The relationship between the hermit, or small child, and the artworld is far from clear.
24. Two important criticisms have not been considered. First, as Dickie admits, his definition of art is circular. In defining "art" he makes reference to the "artworld". Dickie claims this circularity is not a vicious circularity; his definition is informative, and all institutional concepts are circular in this fashion. It is not clear that such a response is adequate. The second criticism is found in Bruce Morton's review of Dickie's Aesthetics: An Introduction (JAAC, 32-1, Fall 1973). According to Morton, "Works of art are logically (and indeed temporally) prior to the institution of the artworld. The only reason for the development of an artworld is that there are first works of art for the institution to develop around. The first work of art (logically) could never have been created, given Dickie's analysis, since there would be no artworld to do the conferring of status." Dickie does not consider this criticism, and it is not clear how he would respond.

CHAPTER FIVE

ON BEING A CANDIDATE FOR APPRECIATION

Four important notions within Dickie's institutional theory of art have been discussed to this point. They are "artifact", "conferring the status", "artworld" and "on behalf of". There are problems relating to all of these notions. Two key notions have not yet been examined, and they concern the nature of the status that Dickie wishes to have artists confer. The conferred status is that of being a "candidate for appreciation". Imbedded in this status are two notions of importance. The first is "being a candidate", the second "appreciation".

The first notion that will be discussed is that of candidacy. Dickie is explicit in his claim that the status that is conferred must be that of "candidate for appreciation", and not simply appreciation.

The third notion involved in the second condition of the definition is candidacy: a member of the artworld confers the status of candidate for appreciation. The definition does not require that a work of art actually be appreciated, even by one person.¹

Dickie considers it essential that his theory allow for the possibility of unappreciated art. This is important because Dickie wishes his theory to be a descriptive, and not an evaluative, theory.

It is important not to build into the definition of the classificatory sense of "work of art" value properties such as actual appreciation: to do so would make it impossible to speak of unappreciated works of art. Building in value properties might even make it awkward to speak of bad works of art. A theory of art must preserve certain central features of the way in which we talk about art, and we do find it necessary sometimes to speak of unappreciated art and of bad art.²

This makes clear the motivation behind Dickie's decision to have the conferred status relate to candidacy, rather than to actual appreciation.

However, it is still far from clear how Dickie understands this notion to function, and the specifics that are involved in it.

Dickie attempts to clarify the notion of candidate for appreciation by contrasting the activities involved in the artworld and the merchandising world. The examples discussed are a salesman displaying his merchandise and the activities surrounding Duchamp's Fountain.³

When, for example, a salesman of plumbing supplies spreads his wares before us, he presents them for our appreciation all right, but the presenting is not a conferring of the status of candidate, it is simply a placing before us. But what is the difference between "placing before" and "conferring the status of candidate"? The difference is analogous to the difference between my uttering "I declare this man to be a candidate for alderman" and the head of the election board uttering the same sentence while acting in his official capacity. When I utter the sentence it has no effect because I have not been vested with any authority in this regard.⁴

However, this seems to be problematic, and the problem appears to stem from the differences in structure between the political world and the artworld. It is clearly delineated in the political world who the head of the election board is, and who can declare candidates for office. The artworld lacks this structure. It is not clear, in the artworld, how anyone could fail to have the capacity to declare candidates. Dickie acknowledges this fact, but does not seem to recognize it as a potential problem.

To return to the plumbing line, the salesman's presentation is different from Duchamp's superficially similar act of displaying a urinal which he christened "Fountain" in that now famous art show. The point is that Duchamp's act took place within a certain institutional setting and that makes all of the difference. Our salesman of plumbing supplies could do what Duchamp did, that is, convert a urinal into a work of art, but he probably would not--such weird ideas seem to occur only to artists with bizarre senses of humor.⁵

Such an observation on Dickie's part only seems to reinforce the apparent problem. The problem concerns the fact that Dickie has stipulated that the artworld is a very wide-open institution. This leads to problems in determining exactly what constitutes the proper institutional setting.

It is exactly this type of problem that leads Ted Cohen to voice

some concerns.

Suppose it is Duchamp who comes to your home, where perhaps you are in need of plumbing fixtures, and sets before you a number of objects, including the urinal. Now what? Dickie's account of appreciation does not help. Dickie notes (p.255a) that the ordinary salesman is presenting his wares for appreciation, but insists that he is not conferring on them the status of candidate for appreciation. But he could do both things couldn't he? Couldn't Duchamp?⁶

This serves to focus one's attention on the central issues involved. Dickie's account of the artworld fails to provide any criteria, or, for that matter, guidance, for determining what constitutes part of the artworld and what does not. This is essential because the activity of conferring in the artworld, for Dickie, is not an explicit activity. One implicitly confers the status by performing certain actions within the artworld, and similar actions outside the artworld fail to confer the status. Determining if the status has been conferred relies solely on determining what constitutes the artworld. However, Dickie's account of the artworld, by the very nature of the artworld, denies the possibility of drawing lines between the artworld and the non-artworld. Cohen continues to raise questions concerning this failure to distinguish the artworld from other institutions.

Suppose that Picasso came to your house hawking his paintings, and didn't care what you did with them. Or better, since you may believe that Picasso's paintings were already art before he got to your house, suppose that he came and was commissioned by you to do a sketch directly on the wall in order to disguise some cracks in the plaster. That would be art, wouldn't it? And if it is when Picasso does it, why not when the neighborhood painter and plasterer do it? And if Duchamp's urinal is art just as readily for having been brought to your house as for having gotten into the show, why not the salesman's?⁷

This serves to illustrate a number of important ideas. Dickie's artworld is unstructured to such a point that his analogy with the political world is inappropriate. It is inappropriate because the dissimilarity concerns their relative formal structure, and it is just this structure that allows one to give an account of what constitutes conferring the status of candidate with such ease in the political world, while it seems so difficult in the artworld.

Dickie explicitly responds to Cohen's concerns. However, it is not clear that Dickie's response appreciates Cohen's reservations. Dickie contends that Cohen has not been fair with his account since, according to Dickie, "My nonanalogous statements qualify my analogy, they make explicit which implications the analogy has in the particular discourse."⁸ Dickie goes on to state, "I do not want to argue about what is the best analogy of artmaking, but I do want to insist that my analogy be understood as it was qualified by my explicit remarks."⁹ However, such assertions seem to miss the point of the Cohen criticism. Dickie's contention seems to be that the analogy is appropriate, even allowing the dissimilarities, since he has qualified the analogy by acknowledging the dissimilarities. Cohen's criticism is not restricted to the claim that the analogy is, in some ways, inappropriate, but rather that the analogy must be wrong. The argument Cohen presents for such a claim can be understood in the following manner. Dickie wishes to make use of the notion of candidacy. In order to explicate how he intends this notion to function within the context of his theory, Dickie presents an analogy between candidate-for-appreciation in the artworld, and candidate-for-election in the political world. This analogy is designed, with qualifications, to illustrate how candidate-for-appreciation works in the artworld. However, candidacy in the political world requires that the institution in question have some rigidly defined rules. These types of rules are absent in the artworld. This disallows the possibility that candidacy in the artworld can be understood in any fashion like that of candidacy in the legal world. Such criticism serves to raise the question of whether or not it is appropriate to speak of candidacy at all. In any event, it becomes impossible for Dickie to distinguish "placing before" and "candidacy", since his attempt to distinguish these two relies heavily on a structured institution; such structure is present in the political world, but is lacking in the artworld.

The problems involved in the notion of candidacy are similar in structure to those that are involved in Dickie's discussion of conferring. Dickie wishes to make use of the notion of conferring in his theory. To explain how this notion is designed to function Dickie presents an

analogy between conferring in the artworld and conferring in the political world. The analogy breaks down because the mechanisms necessary for conferring in the political world have no corresponding equivalent in the artworld. Pointing out, as Dickie does, the different purposes of the institutions does not eliminate the problem. Dickie seems to have the same problem with three of his important notions. These are "conferring", "on behalf of", and "candidacy". The problems associated with each are, to a large extent, traceable to the lack of organized structure in the artworld. Dickie, however, cannot give the artworld this structure, for that results in other problems and an inaccurate description of how the artworld is constituted.

The last notion that is of importance with respect to Dickie's theory of art is that of "appreciation". Dickie is explicit in what he takes appreciation to be.

All that is meant by "appreciation" in the definition is something like "in experiencing the qualities of a thing one finds them worthy or valuable", and this meaning applies quite generally both inside and outside the domain of art.¹⁰

However, it is not clear that such an account of appreciation will prove to be adequate for the purposes of Dickie's theory. Such an account seems to leave Dickie's theory open to at least two criticisms.

The first criticism concerns an apparant inconsistency between Dickie's claim that his definition of art places no constraints on what can be art and his claim that artworks must have a status which concerns appreciation. Cohen raises this point.

What of an artifact which clearly cannot be appreciated (in Dickie's sense)? I say that there are such things--for instance, ordinary thumbtacks, cheap white envelopes, the plastic forks given at some drive-in restaurants--and that if Dickie's definition were correct then these things could not be artworks because they could not receive the requisite status.¹¹

Cohen goes on to raise this concern with one of Dickie's favorite examples; the example is Duchamp's Fountain.

Duchamp's urinal is like that. Things like that cannot acquire the status required by Dickie's second condition because it would be pointless or bizarre to give it to them....

In fact, the untoward consequence of Dickie's suggestion is that it will rule out the very items Dickie is eager to accommodate. But then what about "Fountain"? Is Duchamp's "Fountain" a work of art, and Dickie's definition wrong because it misses this work, or is Dickie right and so "Fountain" not art? Neither of these choices is a healthy one.¹²

Cohen raises two issues. One, Dickie's theory does place restrictions on what can be art since not every artifact can be appreciated. Two, in particular, Dickie's constant reference to Fountain is problematic because Fountain is precisely an object which cannot be appreciated.

Dickie's response to Cohen's first concern is a denial that there are artifacts which cannot be appreciated.

Also, the very things which Cohen cites as paradigms of things which cannot be appreciated--ordinary thumbtacks, cheap white envelopes, and plastic forks--have appreciable qualities which can be noted if one focuses attention on them. Photographs frequently bring out these qualities of quite ordinary things by focusing narrowly on them. It seems very likely that the constraint of appreciability which Cohen wishes to place on my definition is vacuous, since it is unlikely that any object would lack some quality which is appreciable.¹³

Such claims on Dickie's part provide the basis for his response to Cohen's concerns about the appreciability of Fountain.

Cohen says that it is Duchamp's gesture which can be appreciated and not Fountain itself. Fountain has the gesture significance that Cohen attributes to it, specifically, it was a protest of a kind. But Fountain has many qualities which can be appreciated--its gleaming white surface, for example. In fact, it has several qualities which resemble those of works of Brancusi and Moore.¹⁴

However, it is not clear that Dickie's response is adequate. Even granting that Fountain has appreciable qualities, it is not the case that these qualities are the important artistic qualities of Fountain.¹⁵

The second criticism concerning Dickie's account of appreciation is that the account opens the possibility of counter-examples to the theory of art. William Blizek offers one such counter-example.

Suppose, for example, that an accepted art critic claims that the diary of artist X is worthy or valuable because it helps us understand the symbolism of X's painting. Here is a case in which a member of the artworld, acting on behalf of the artworld, confers the status of candidate for appreciation upon the diary of X. Does the diary become a work of art?¹⁶

It is clear that on Dickie's definition of art the diary becomes a work of art. Moreover, it becomes the art of the critic, not artist X, since it is the critic who has conferred the status upon the object. This suggests that Dickie's account of appreciation is not sufficient. In particular, Dickie may require some distinction between aesthetic appreciation and other appreciation. Blizek acknowledges that Dickie denies the existence of such a distinction.

Dickie might contend that appreciation in art is not different from appreciation in general, as the quotation above suggests, but that what distinguishes the painting which is art from the diary which is not is that the status (candidate for appreciation) is conferred by someone "acting on behalf of the artworld".¹⁷

This does seem to be Dickie's only alternative. It seems reasonably clear that we wish to deny that the diary is a work of art. Dickie's definition is such that the diary meets his criteria for being a candidate for appreciation. His only option, therefore, is to deny that the critic is acting on behalf of the artworld. However, this also leads to problems.

If one rejects the contention that the critic above is acting on behalf of the artworld, an artworld which defines "acting on behalf of" is one that is itself more narrowly defined than one in which anyone can be a member who sees himself as a member.¹⁸

Blizek's point now becomes clear. If Dickie wishes to deny that the diary is art, then he must do one of two things. One, he may attempt to distinguish aesthetic appreciation from other kinds of appreciation. Dickie explicitly rejects such an alternative.¹⁹ Two, Dickie can claim that the critic is not acting on behalf of the artworld. Such a claim is inconsistent with Dickie's discussion of Duchamp and the salesman, as well as the claim that anyone who sees himself as a member of the artworld is a member. In this case, as with some of the other notions, it is Dickie's account of the artworld that leads to much of the difficulty. Again, the artworld's lack of structure allows the possibility of such counter-examples.

Two notions have been examined in this chapter. They are the notions of "candidacy" and of "appreciation". Both of them have proved to be

problematic. For either of these notions to be adequate, Dickie requires a more tightly governed artworld. Having examined all of the important notions of the theory, and finding fault with them all, it is now appropriate to turn to questions concerning what leads Dickie to develop the theory in its present form, and whether or not revisions²⁰ can be forwarded that will solve the problems inherent in the theory.

CHAPTER FIVE FOOTNOTES

1. George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), p.39.
2. Ibid., p.40.
3. Marcel Duchamp first gained his reputation as an artist in the early twentieth century because of his paintings. However, since 1923 Duchamp has not produced paintings. His major role in the development of art concerns the "ready made movement"; a movement of which many consider him to be the founder. "Ready makes" is a term which is used to refer to manufactured objects that are presented as works of art. Snow shovels, hat racks, steel bars, and a diversified variety of objects have been associated with this movement. Perhaps the most famous of the "ready makes" that Duchamp is responsible for is Fountain. This "ready made" was a urinal that was purchased from a supplier of bathroom fixtures in New York. It was signed "R. Mutt", and Duchamp attempted to enter Fountain in a New York exhibition in 1917. The work was rejected, but has now become one of Duchamp's most important contributions to modern art.
4. George Dickie, "Defining Art", APQ, volume 6, number 3, July 1969, p.255.
5. Ibid., p.255.
6. Ted Cohen, "The Possibility of Art", reprinted in Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, eds. George Dickie and Richard Sclafani (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p.187.
7. Ibid., p.187.
8. George Dickie, "The Actuality of Art", reprinted in Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, op.cit., p.198.
9. Ibid., p.199.
10. George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis, op.cit., p.40.

11. Ted Cohen, op.cit., p.191.
12. Ibid., p.191.
13. George Dickie, "The Actuality of Art", op.cit., p.200.
14. Ibid., p.199.
15. This issue is examined in chapter six.
16. William Blizek, "An Institutional Theory of Art", BJA, 14-2, Spring 1974, p.146.
17. Ibid., p.146.
18. Ibid., p.146.
19. See chapter two, pp.21-22.
20. The former question is examined in chapter six, while chapter seven is concerned with the latter question.

CHAPTER SIX
MODERN ART: THE "READY MADE" MOVEMENT

Many of the problems in Dickie's institutional theory of art are traceable to two points that seem peculiar to the theory. One is the notion of conferring, while the second concerns Dickie's separation of artistic creativity and the art-making process.¹ These two points are clearly related since it is the notion of conferring that results in the separation of artistic creativity and the art-making process. Many of the criticisms that have been directed at Dickie's theory concern these two points. Michael Mitias criticizes Dickie in these areas, and his criticism reflects the inter-connected nature of the two issues.

But Dickie does not explain how or in what sense a person who confers artistic status is creative. The fact that anything may become art does not necessarily encourage creativity; for conferring artistic status on an object does not imply that the object is creatively made.²

Given this potentially serious criticism, one wonders why Dickie chose to construct his theory in the fashion that he did. The reasons for this decision become clear when one considers Dickie's understanding of the "ready made movement",³ and his discussion of Duchamp and Fountain.

Two elements of Dickie's discussion of Duchamp's Fountain are important. One concerns the activity of Duchamp, the artist, while the other concerns exactly what kind of object Fountain, the artwork, is. Both of these elements are made clear in Dickie's discussion of Duchamp and a salesman who is selling plumbing supplies. According to Dickie, "The salesman could do what Duchamp did, that is, convert a urinal into a work of art, but such a thing probably would not occur to him."⁴ On Dickie's analysis, Duchamp succeeded in making a work of art without any artistic creativity. Duchamp "converted" the urinal into a work of art;

he did not create an object himself. As for Fountain, the artwork and the urinal are one and the same object.⁵ On such an understanding of "ready made" art, the motivation behind the institutional theory of art becomes clear. If, for example, Duchamp can produce a work of art by simply taking an object that already exists, and not as a work of art, and convert that object into a work of art, then traditional claims about the connection between artistic creativity and the art-making process must be wrong.

Traditional aesthetic theory is based on the contention that in order to produce a work of art one must make something; and that art-making is, in some necessary way, connected with artistic creativity. Dickie makes both these contentions, and Dickie's rejection of them, clear.

It is generally understood that the phenomenon of creativity is obtained when the artist struggles to produce through his medium--lines, colors, words, marble, motion--a unique aesthetic form; but in the act of conferring artistic status there is hardly any room for creativity, for the person who administers the act does not materially contribute anything to the object.⁶

On Dickie's analysis of the circumstances surrounding Duchamp and Fountain, both the elements of making an object and a connection between art-making and artistic creativity are lacking. Duchamp did not make anything; he simply did something with an existing object. Any creativity that Duchamp showed did not involve art making creativity since he did not make an object. Therefore, art-making and artistic creativity are not necessarily connected. According to Dickie, if one wants to offer an adequate definition of art, then one must be able to account for such a phenomenon. Once one allows such possibilities, one has severed any necessary connection between artistic creativity and art-making.

Given such an account of Duchamp's activity, and that Dickie's theory is inadequate, one has three options. One, an attempt can be made to modify Dickie's theory to account for the objections that have been raised against it. Two, one can deny that Fountain and "ready made" in general are works of art; and, three, one can examine Dickie's analysis of Fountain and other "ready made" in order to determine if he

has provided an adequate analysis. Given the difficulties in Dickie's theory, it is not a matter of modifying the theory, but rather of offering a new theory which tries to preserve Dickie's central theme about the institutional nature of art.⁷ In addition, it would be presumptuous, and possibly self-serving, to deny the status of art to "ready made". Dickie is right about this.

My basic reason for considering Fountain a work of art is the fact that it seems to occupy a position within our art-world similar to the Mona Lisa, Nude Descending a Staircase, and the like. It is written about in art history books; it is displayed in art galleries. When I saw it in a show about 1964, Fountain occupied the central location in the large hall devoted to the display of Duchamp's works. The Duchamp paintings in the show were hung on a wall to the side. It seems to me that there is nothing for us to decide about Fountain one way or the other, it is a work of art and an important one.⁸

This leaves the possibility that Dickie's account of Fountain and Duchamp's activity is wrong. If this is found to be the case, then much of the motivation for a theory of art such as Dickie's will be undercut.

What exactly does Dickie's theory of art entail? Anything can be art, and anyone who sees himself as a member of the artworld can confer the status of candidate for appreciation. The conferring of this status on an object is sufficient for the object's becoming a work of art. This does seem to lead to theoretical problems. Anita Silvers points this out.

It is difficult to see, on Dickie's account, what could prevent a particularly energetic status-conferrer from sweeping through the world systematically labelling every artifact "art". In this case, to distinguish something as art would not be to distinguish it at all. Conferring the status of art would have no function and the institution would collapse.⁹

In addition to emphasizing the difference between conferring and classifying, this theoretical possibility suggests that something more complex is involved in the production of art works.

This theoretical possibility raises questions about Dickie's understanding of "ready made" since Dickie claims such objects to be paradigm cases of art works being produced solely on the basis of conferring. Ted Cohen, for one, is hesitant to accept Dickie's analysis of

this situation with respect to Fountain.

Dickie calls Duchamp's "Fountain" a work of art with no hesitation, and I think he believes it a substantial achievement of his theory that it easily accommodates things like the works of Dada. But does it? I agree that whatever Dada's practitioners thought, their accomplishment was not simply the creation of Un-art. It was, however, the creation of something different.¹⁰

Cohen's uncertainty is evident in the importance that he places on the gesture, which does not seem to be an act of conferring, which Fountain represents. "What significance we find in 'Fountain' we find not in the urinal but in Duchamp's gesture."¹¹ This reflects Cohen's reluctance to accept Dickie's account of what the object Fountain is. Dickie, in his response to Cohen, reinforces the fact that he perceives Fountain to be nothing more than the urinal.

Cohen says that it is Duchamp's gesture which can be appreciated and not Fountain itself. Fountain has the gesture significance that Cohen attributes to it, specifically, it was a protest of a kind. But Fountain has many qualities which can be appreciated--its gleaming white surface, for example.¹²

There seems to be a problem here. If Cohen is right about the importance of Duchamp's gesture, and Dickie admits he is, then Dickie's response about what can be appreciated about Fountain is inappropriate. While it is still not clear what the exact nature of Fountain is, Dickie seems to be suggesting that appreciation be restricted to the physical object. If Fountain involves more than simply a physical object, then Dickie is wrong. To attempt to appreciate Fountain solely on a physical basis would be similar to attempting to appreciate a poem on the basis of the combination of marks it produces when written down. A poem involves more than such marks, and "ready made" and, thereby, Fountain may also involve more.

Silvers is one individual who challenges Dickie's analysis of Fountain in terms of a physical object.

I am contending that what Duchamp did to the plumbing fixture is important not as an accompanying gesture which turns a plumbing fixture into art, but rather because Duchamp's activities plus the plumbing fixture constitute the art object called Fountain. This may make Fountain an object falling

on the borderline between performance and sculpture, but it does not entail that Fountain lies on the borderline between art and non-art.¹³

This type of account of what Fountain is has important consequences with respect to Dickie's view. In particular, it entails that his analysis of Fountain as a urinal that was simply "converted" into an artwork must be incorrect. Silvers makes this point. "Moreover, if the object called Fountain is more than the plumbing fixture, we again do not have an example of a non-art object made art simply by being called art."¹⁴ If Fountain and the urinal are not the same object, then the possibility that Duchamp created an object when he presented Fountain to the artworld exists. On such an account, the urinal is only a part of the new object. The artwork Fountain is a composition of the urinal and Duchamp's gesture. Just as a poem is a combination of physical and non-physical attributes, Fountain is composed of different types of attributes; and the urinal is part of the artwork by being the basis for the artwork's physical properties.

Silvers' proposal is in some ways analogous to the situation that Devereux considers with respect to a natural object becoming part of an artifact when the natural object is taken home and placed on display. Dickie wishes to allow that natural objects can become works of art in this way. Given that the artifactuality condition is deemed necessary, Dickie requires some means for such natural objects to become artifacts. This is achieved with a special account of artifactuality. However, as Devereux points out, if one understands the natural object as forming only part of the artifact, then the need for conferring artifactuality no longer exists. This serves to eliminate a potentially serious problem. Dickie also wishes to allow that Fountain is a work of art. Since Dickie understands Fountain as being nothing more than the urinal, an account of art production is required that allows the possibility of an object's becoming art by means of conferring. However, as Silvers points out, if one understands the urinal as being only a part of the artwork, then the question remains open as to whether or not art making is to be understood in terms of conferring status. If Duchamp made an object, and did not simply confer status on an existing object, there may be a necess-

any connection between artistic creativity and art production.¹⁵ Given Silvers' account of "ready made", any motivation that exists for adopting a theory of art that is based on conferring is undercut. Thus, it is essential that the correct account of "ready made" be determined.

Silvers' account, or one similar to it, is to be preferred over Dickie's for a variety of reasons. Such an account avoids the theoretical problem associated with conferring that Silvers points out. If art is a conferred status, then it is logically possible for this status to be conferred on every artifact in existence. On Dickie's view, "art" is viewed in a fashion much like a proper noun. It is possible that every individual in the world could be christened "George". However, if one understands art in terms of creativity and the production of new objects, then "art" becomes a term that is used to classify objects. Silvers' view entails that "art" is a common noun; one that is used to classify objects into a certain category. Restraints can be placed on what constitutes a member of the category, and, therefore, it is not possible to classify every artifact as a work of art.

In addition, Silvers' account offers a more tenable view of what one should appreciate, and evaluate, with respect to "ready made" like Fountain. Dickie is committed to the claim that one should appreciate the physical qualities of Fountain since these are the only qualities that Fountain possesses. Silvers allows the possibility of appreciating, and evaluating, the gestures of Fountain. This is a more accurate account of the actual occurrences in the artworld.

Finally, if one views Fountain as being an object on the borderline between sculpture and presentation, as Silvers does, then one is in a position to account for the fact that more than one Fountain exists in the artworld.¹⁶ Just as poems exist on more than one piece of paper, more than one urinal is associated with Fountain.¹⁷ Considerations such as these three lead one to reject the analysis of Fountain that Dickie offers in terms of the artwork and the urinal being one and the same object. Clearly, Fountain is a more complicated object than Dickie perceives.

Dickie's theory of art has been critically examined. It has failed to stand up to criticism. In addition, the motivation that leads to the

formulation of a theory based on conferring has been shown to be based on an improper analysis of the "readymade movement" in twentieth century art. However, the question remains as to whether or not a new institutional theory can be formulated in light of a proper understanding of twentieth century art.

CHAPTER SIX FOOTNOTES

1. One of the major criticisms of the notion of conferring is that it alters the traditional role of the artist from making to presenting. See chapter four, pp.42-43.
2. Michael Mitias, "Art as a Social Institution", Per, 56-3, Summer 1977, p.332.
3. See footnote three in chapter five for explanation of the movement.
4. George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), p.38.
5. Dickie also discusses Walter de Maria's High Energy Bar in the same context, and he identifies the artwork solely with the stainless-steel bar.
6. Michael Mitias, op.cit., p.332.
7. An attempt to do this is made in chapter seven.
8. George Dickie, "The Actuality of Art", reprinted in Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, eds. George Dickie and Richard Sclafani (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p.197.
9. Anita Silvers, "The Artwork Discarded", JAAC, 34-4, Summer 1976, p.443.
10. Ted Cohen, "The Possibility of Art", reprinted in Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, op.cit., p.185.
11. Ibid., p.192.
12. George Dickie, "The Actuality of Art", op.cit., p.199.
13. Anita Silvers, op.cit., p.450.
14. Ibid., p.450.
15. It is not completely clear in what sense Duchamp is being crea-

tive. However, since artistic creativity is traditionally associated with making an object, and not choosing one, the fact that Duchamp made an object allows him to be accredited with some minimal sense of artistic creativity.

16. The original Fountain was lost. There was a second version, and a third version. The third version was the Galleria Schwarz edition, and had eight numbered copies. All were viewed as Fountain, not reproductions of Fountain. See Richard Hamilton, ed. Not Seen and/or Less Seen of/by Marcel Duchamp/Rose Selavy, Houston: Cordier and Ekstrom, Inc., 1964.
17. This raises questions about which properties of Fountain are accidental, and which are necessary. Such questions will not be explicitly addressed.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE INSTITUTIONAL THEORY REVISITED

Two questions remain about the institutional theory of art. The first concerns the possibility of modifying Dickie's version of the theory so that it is no longer open to the objections that have been brought to bear against it. The second question is of a more general nature, and concerns the general acceptability of the institutional approach to the problem of defining art. These two questions provide the focal points for the discussions in this chapter.

The discussion in chapter six provides insight into how certain of the problems in Dickie's institutional theory of art can be rectified.¹ The two problems cited in chapter six are Dickie's separation of artistic creativity and the art-making process, and the claim that one can produce a work of art without creating an object. Dickie offers a version of the institutional theory that incorporates these features because of his understanding of the "ready made movement" in modern art. This understanding, however, has been shown to be unacceptable.² Therefore, it may be possible to provide a new version of the theory that takes into account the criticisms of the original version, and that is grounded in a proper understanding of certain trends in modern art.

Dickie's version of the institutional theory is:

A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld).³

It is the acceptance of the notion of "conferring" that leads Dickie to much of his difficulty. Dickie contends that such an account is required because of the fact that certain trends in modern art allow, or seem to

allow, that one can convert a non-art object into a work of art.⁴ This entails that one can create a work of art without the making of an object. However, once one understands, for example, that Duchamp created an object through his presentation of the urinal, the object being Fountain, the need for conferring artistic status disappears. It once again becomes possible to require the production of an object in making art. This allows for modifications within Dickie's version of the institutional theory.

The first modification concerns the elimination of the problematic notion of "conferring". Given that much of the criticism concerning this notion relates to the fact that it allows for the production of art without the creation of an object, the notion that will replace "conferring" is that of "creating".⁵ This change, in turn, requires that other notions within the theory be altered. If one is creating, and not conferring, then the notions involved in conferring "the status of candidate for appreciation" no longer need to play a role in the theory. This is a positive consequence since the notions involved in the conferred status have also been the subject of criticism.⁶ Thus, the notions "candidate for" and "appreciation" are simply eliminated from this definition of art. Criticism has also been directed at Dickie's use of the notion "acting on behalf of". The criticism suggests that, given the nature of the artworld, it makes more sense to consider artists to be acting within the context of the artworld rather than acting on behalf of the artworld.⁷ Given that such a modification is easily incorporated into a new version of the theory that makes use of the notion of "creating", and not "conferring", this change can also be made. This new version of the institutional theory allows that artists produce art "within the context of" the artworld, and not "on behalf of" the artworld.

Criticism directed at Dickie's account of artifactuality has yet to be considered. Dickie's problems with respect to artifactuality are a result of his account of "conferring artifactuality".⁸ It has been demonstrated that Dickie does not require this notion if he accepts some minor alterations with respect to the ontological status of natural objects that one picks up and takes home. Dickie claims that such objects

can become works of art, and, therefore, they must be artifacts. However, rather than claiming such objects are works of art and artifacts, it can be claimed that these objects form only a part of the work of art and a part of the artifact.⁹ This eliminates the need for a special account which involves artifactuality being conferred, and, as a result, eliminates the concerns with Dickie's account of artifactuality.

Given the proposed modifications, a radically different version of the institutional theory comes to light: "A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) which is created within the context of the artworld." Much of the criticism that was directed at the original version of the theory no longer applies. This is hardly surprising given that the new version of the theory does not contain four of the notions, and alters the account of the fifth, that were originally present.¹⁰

Since the notion of the "artworld" is maintained in the new version of the theory, criticisms directed at this notion in the original formulation proposed by Dickie must be re-examined. One such criticism concerned the scope of the artworld.¹¹ It is still not clear how the boundaries of the artworld can be defined. Concerns about the boundaries of the artworld manifest themselves clearly when one considers questions about whether or not a small child, or hermit, can produce works of art.¹² It is difficult to see how this possibility can be denied. However, if the question is answered in the affirmative, it becomes unclear what distinguishes the artworld from society at large.

It is essential, however, that some means be found to make such a distinction. Since, on the modified version of the theory, art is "created within the context of the artworld", the artworld appears to offer the only possible means of delineating the class of works of art from all other classes. The notion of "created" cannot provide such delineation since creativity is not restricted to the artworld. "Within the context of" also fails to offer the necessary means for the identification of art works. Any function that such a notion can serve requires that one antecedently determine the boundaries of the artworld since the applications of "within the context of" are not restricted to situations involv-

ing art.¹³ One may act within the context of the educational system, for example, and there is over-lap between the educational institutions and the artworld. Therefore, when one is acting within the context of the educational institutions one must have knowledge of the boundaries of the artworld before one can know if one is acting within the context of the artworld as well.

The problem, at this point, is analogous in structure to the problem Dickie faces with respect to distinguishing the activity of Duchamp in the presentation of the urinal from the activity of a plumbing salesman attempting to sell his merchandise.¹⁴ On Dickie's view, the only means of distinguishing the activities of these two individuals is on the basis of the activities taking place in different institutional contexts. However, if such a way of distinguishing the activities is to be adequate, a means by which the artworld can be distinguished from all other institutions must be provided. It should be noted that any attempt to define the boundaries of the artworld cannot make reference to making art. For example, one cannot claim that the boundaries of the artworld are defined in terms such as "anyone who makes art is a member of the artworld". On the institutional model, one must be a member of the artworld before one can make art. This feature of the institutional theory, together with the fact that the artworld is such that "anyone who sees himself as a member of the artworld is thereby a member",¹⁵ means that no rigidly defined boundaries can be provided for the artworld. This should not be found surprising. The artworld, as it functions in reality, lacks such boundaries. The artworld, as an institution, is "an established practise or custom"; it is not "a corporation".¹⁶ Therefore, to attempt to impose rigid boundaries on the artworld, besides being difficult, or impossible, would be to fail to appreciate the way the artworld actually functions.

The inability to establish boundaries for the artworld, however, seems to allow for the existence of counter-examples to the new formulation of the theory. Consider again the case of an artist who keeps a diary containing his own thoughts and feelings towards the works of art that he creates.¹⁷ The diary is clearly an artifact. It seems to be the

case that it was created within the context of the artworld. If this case is not to serve as a counter-example, then one of two alternatives must be adopted. First, one may deny that the notion of the "artworld" covers such a case, or, second, it may be claimed that the artist was not acting within the context of the artworld in the keeping of the diary. Given that the artist uses the diary to record his thoughts and feelings about his works of art, it is difficult to see how either of these alternatives can be adopted.

Any attempt that is made to claim that the notion of the "artworld" is inappropriate in such a case results in changes in the notion as it has been understood. Such a claim results in a more restricted "artworld". The artist is clearly a member of the artworld on the original account of the artworld. In fact, it is difficult to see how the artist can fail to be a member of the artworld under any description of the artworld. The second alternative, which involves the notion of "within the context of", seems to be equally problematic with respect to formulating a response. Given that a broad notion of the "artworld" must be retained, it seems to be the case that any activity that is associated with art constitutes activity "within the context of" the artworld. If the artworld concerns all activity that is related to art, then an artist, in putting his thoughts on paper, about his works of art is performing an activity related to art. It is difficult to see how this does not entail that the artist is working within the context of the artworld. The diary is, therefore, a work of art; it is an artifact which was created within the context of the artworld. Thus, a counter-example has been formulated to the modified version of the institutional theory. Clearly, diaries are objects which are classified as works of art under only the most unusual conditions.¹⁸ There is nothing special about this case. However, on this version of the theory, it does qualify as a work of art.

A new formulation of Dickie's institutional theory of art has been considered. Alterations were made in the original version to attempt to account for the criticisms that had been brought to bear against it. Even in its modified form the theory is open to criticism. As is the case with much of the criticism directed at the original version of the

theory, this criticism relates to the notion of the "artworld", and its relationship to the other notions in the theory. This raises questions about the acceptability of the notion of the "artworld" for playing a role in any theory of art.

Dickie's institutional theory of art seems to represent a radical departure from the traditional attempts to answer the question, "What is art?". For this reason, even though Dickie's version and a substantively different formulation of the theory fail to stand up under criticism, the possibility of defining art in a way that preserves the institutional nature of Dickie's theory must be considered. The essence of the institutional theory involves the claim that art must be understood in terms of institutional properties. Therefore, the first question that must be considered in evaluating the whole institutional approach to defining art concerns which of the notions in Dickie's theory are essential to the type of relation, or relations, that the institutional approach requires.

Given that the alternative formulation of the institutional theory considered earlier lacked several of the notions found in Dickie's version of the theory, it is clear that these notions cannot be essential to any version of the institutional theory.¹⁹ This leaves only two of the central notions of Dickie's theory to be considered. They are the notions of "artifact" and the "artworld". The question of whether or not artifactuality is a necessary condition for art is independent of questions concerning the institutional, or non-institutional, nature of art.²⁰ Therefore, artifactuality is not an essential element of any institutional theory of art. This leaves only one of Dickie's central notions: the notion of the "artworld".

The notion of the "artworld", or some analogous notion, is clearly essential to any formulation of the institutional theory of art. The institutional approach to defining art asserts the existence of some relation between the work of art and a social institution; without some institution, the necessary relation cannot exist. Therefore, the central question that must be addressed in evaluating the institutional approach in general concerns the notion of the "artworld", and the existence of

some appropriate relation between art objects and the artworld. If it can be shown that the notion of the "artworld" cannot play a role in defining art, either directly or by standing in a certain relation, then the whole institutional approach to the problem of defining art is unsatisfactory.

Given that the notion of the "artworld" is essential to any version of the institutional theory, the criticism directed at both the original theory and the alternative formulation must be re-considered. In particular, an attempt must be made to determine if such criticism has general application to all possible versions of the institutional theory. One criticism that is common to both versions of the theory concerns the boundaries of the artworld.²¹ It is not clear how the boundaries of the artworld are defined, or its membership determined. The institutional approach, in general, seems to have the same dilemma that is present in both formulations of the theory. Can a small child make art? What about a hermit? If one attempts to answer in the negative, then one is faced with empirical evidence to the contrary.²² Parents proudly display the "art" that their young children bring home from kindergarten. It is difficult to see how one can deny that such objects are works of art, unless one already has a theory in mind that disallows them. This simply results in a failure to view the empirical data objectively. Therefore, the questions about small children and hermits must be answered in the affirmative. This turns the artworld into little more than society at large. While such a characterization of the artworld seems accurate, it results, as will be seen, in an artworld that has no explanatory power.

Given the wide-open nature of the artworld, the relations between the work of art and the artworld increase in importance. It is these relations that will determine the viability of the institutional approach to defining art. The relations that exist are of two distinct kinds, and this reflects the fact that the institutional approach must provide answers to two distinct questions: One, what is the relationship between the artworld and its membership? Two, what is the relationship between the work of art and the artist.²³ Each of these questions requires individual attention in order to determine if any answer within the insti-

tutional framework can provide a satisfactory definition of art.

The first question concerns the relation that exists between the artworld and its membership. On Dickie's version of the theory, this relation is understood in terms of "acting on behalf of", while the new formulation proposes that this relation is "acting within the context of". Consider any relation, call it X, that is designed to be the relation that exists between the institution of the artworld and its membership. It is clear that this relation alone cannot provide an adequate basis for a definition of art. X, as a relation, stands between the artworld and all of its members. Thus, X stands between the artworld and artists, the artworld and art critics, and the artworld and art gallery directors; it stands between the artworld and any individual who is a member of the artworld. Given that it is artists who produce art, and not, for example, art critics, X will not provide a basis for distinguishing the art-making activities of artists from the activities of critics which do not count as art-making. Therefore, it is impossible for any relation that is designed to answer the question concerning the relation between the artworld and its membership to provide the sole basis for defining art. Some other relation is required.

The second type of relation, call it Z, concerns the relation that exists between the artist and the work of art. If the institutional approach is to be sound, then a relation of this nature must be provided to define art. Two possible types of relations may be forwarded that attempt to establish the relation between artists and works of art, and, thereby delineate the class of art objects from all other classes. One relates the artist and art object through a unique activity that is distinct from all other kinds of activity. The second relates the artist and work of art in a manner that is not distinct from all other activity except by means of the activity's taking place in a certain social setting or institution. All relations that connect the work of art and the artist must fall into one of these two categories. Each of these possibilities must be examined in order to determine if it can provide a basis for defining art which is compatible with the essential nature of the institutional approach.

The first possible understanding of relation Z is in terms of an activity that is distinct from all other activities regardless of their respective institutional settings. Z is here a relation that exists between artists and works of art, and the unique activity associating the two is found nowhere else. Examples of such a relation are "creating significant form", or "embodying emotion".²⁴ If Z is understood in such a fashion, then the relation between the artist and the art object is defined in terms that make no necessary reference to a social institution. This results in the institution playing no role in establishing the distinction between the class of art objects and all other classes. The institution of the artworld, and the notion of the "artworld", do not act as a component of such a relation. Therefore, the class of art objects and the actual definition of art are established without reference to an institutional relation. If Z is understood in such a fashion, then the institutional approach cannot be sound since no institution plays a role in understanding Z.

The second possibility allows that the relation between artists and works of art does not concern an activity that is distinct from all other activity except through taking place in a specified social institution. Examples of such a relation are "conferring the status" or "creating".²⁵ If Z is understood in this fashion, then it fails to provide a means of delineating the class of works of art from all other classes. Consider the notion of the "artworld". The "artworld" either may have a boundary and membership that is clearly defined, or it may lack these characteristics. Suppose that the notion of the "artworld" forwarded in the institutional approach is based on the claim that the "artworld" has these features. The possession of such characteristics means that the notion of the "artworld" that is functioning in the institutional approach is inconsistent with the actual artworld. Therefore, the institutional approach is inadequate because it fails to offer, and be based upon, an accurate account of the relevant social institution.

Suppose, on the other hand, that the notion of the "artworld" is understood in a manner that is consistent with the actual artworld. On such an analysis of the "artworld", the artworld lacks any clearly de-

defined boundaries or membership. However, this is problematic. Given that Z is defined as to distinguish the activity of artists from others solely on the basis of the relevant institutions, a failure to have a clearly defined institution results in a failure to be able to adequately isolate the class of activities associated with Z from all other activities. Since the institutional approach attempts to define art, on this possible understanding of Z, on the basis of the different social institution governing art, the inability to isolate the activities that occur in the institution results in an inability to isolate the class of art objects from other classes. Therefore, if Z is understood as being a relation that connects the artist and the work of art on the basis of a social institution, and not a distinct activity, then it is not possible to offer an adequate definition of art within the context of the institutional approach. Thus, the artworld fails to have any explanatory power with respect to offering a characterization of the relation between artists and art objects, and, as a result, the notion of the "artworld" fails to have any explanatory power with respect to defining art. Thus, we see that the characteristic of the actual artworld of lacking any clearly defined boundaries or membership is not simply a problem for Dickie's account and for the modified institutional account offered earlier in this chapter, but is in fact the basis for the rejection of the institutional approach in general.

The institutional approach, in the final analysis, fails to provide any adequate basis for defining art. This is not to say, however, that this failure entails that the institutional approach, and Dickie's efforts to formulate a definition within the context of this approach, fail to provide any useful insight into the issues concerning the nature of art. Such insights are present and, in conclusion, they must be clarified.

The most important feature of the institutional approach to defining art concerns the explicit reference to a social institution. In this fashion, it serves to make clear the largely unacknowledged fact that art, in some manner, has a social, or cultural, nature. The difficulty, however, is that when the institution governing this social activity, the

artworld, is construed in the proper and correct way, this insight is seen also to be contained within the context of the traditional theories. It has simply been taken for granted, in many cases, that artifactuality is a necessary, but relatively uncontroversial, condition for art. Yet, when one reflects on the notion of artifactuality, which is loosely understood as "man-made", it becomes clear that the notion of "man" in "man-made" represents no more or less than the notion of the "artworld" does in the institutional approach.²⁶

In some way, therefore, both Dickie's account of the institutional theory and the modified version are, in one sense, redundant. Both of these formulations make explicit reference to the notions of "artifact" and the "artworld". Dickie fails to realize that such redundancy is present in his theory because, even though he sees that the artworld has to be broad and wide, he thinks that the other notions are essential. This leads him to limit the artworld in ways that are in conflict with his original understanding of the artworld.²⁷ In addition, the failure to recognize this redundancy is traceable to the fact that Dickie has too broad a notion of artifactuality.²⁸

The social nature of art was always only implicit in traditional attempts to define art. The notion of "man" was buried in "man-made", which in turn was buried in "artifact". Therefore, even though the institutional approach cannot itself provide a basis for defining art, the real value of the approach is in making clear, and explicit, features concerning the nature of art that are hazy, and implicit, in traditional theories. The institutional approach makes explicit, as well as showing the importance, of the social nature of art.²⁹

Recognition of the social nature of art strengthens one's position with respect to understanding the nature of art.³⁰ It forces one to consider art in a larger perspective rather than focusing one's attention so narrowly that one is examining art in a vacuum.³¹ Traditional theories have sometimes failed to retain a large enough perspective in examining questions about the nature of art.³² The institutional approach makes clear that art must be studied, evaluated and defined in an institutional, or social, context.³³

CHAPTER SEVEN FOOTNOTES

1. The insight stems from the discussion concerning Silvers. See chapter six, pp.62-65.
2. The support for this claim is found in Cohen's and Silvers' discussion of Fountain. See chapter six, pp.61-65.
3. George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), p.34.
4. Dickie makes explicit use of the term "convert". See George Dickie, op.cit., p.44.
5. For a discussion of this issue, see chapter four, pp.42-44.
6. See chapter five, pp.53-55 for Cohen's discussion of these concerns.
7. Bachrach directs this criticism at Dickie. See chapter four, pp.44-45.
8. For discussion of this concern, see chapter three, pp.30-33.
9. Devereux discusses this possibility. See chapter three, pp.34-35.
10. The four notions that are deleted are "conferring", "candidate for", "appreciation", and "acting on behalf of". The notion of "artifact" is construed differently because of the elimination of the possibility of "conferring artifactuality".
11. See the discussion of Cohen's concerns, chapter five, pp.50-52.
12. For the original discussion of this example, see chapter four, pp.43-44.
13. This seems to reflect a problem with the notion of the "artworld". The problem is considered later in this chapter.
14. See chapter five, pp.50-53 for a discussion of this case.
15. George Dickie, op.cit., p.36.

16. These terms are used by Dickie. See chapter four, pp.38-39.
17. This example is a slight modification of one used by Blizek. For his example, and discussion, see chapter five, pp.54-55.
18. The unusual conditions usually lead to the diary being considered as literature. This is not the case here. It should be noted that, on this version of the institutional theory, any book concerning art is a work of art.
19. For the sake of completeness, the reasons that these notions are not essential will be provided. One can maintain the institutional nature of Dickie's theory without retaining the notion of "conferring". As the theory's title suggests, the essential nature of the institutional approach concerns the existence of some relation between the work of art and a social institution. This relation need not be understood in terms of "conferring"; any relation which connects the object and the institution preserves the approach's essential nature. This entails that the conferred status of "candidate for appreciation" is not an essential component of any institutional theory of art. If the relation does not involve "conferring", then there is no conferred status. Analogous considerations apply with respect to "acting on behalf of". A different relation may require different notions.
20. Dickie treats these as two distinct questions. He attempts to establish the artifactuality condition before he examines the institutional issue. See George Dickie, op.cit., p.27.
21. For a discussion of the problem in Dickie's theory, see chapter five, pp.50-53.
22. Dickie realizes that a negative response has difficulties. He offers a notion of the "artworld" that seems broad enough to incorporate such cases.
23. It may be possible to connect the artworld and the work of art directly. The open concept theory's account of "criteria of recognition" seems to represent such a possibility. The question of whether an object is a work of art is answered solely on the basis of the object possessing certain characteristics. The relevant characteristics could be established directly by the artworld. For a discussion of the notion of "criteria of recognition", see chapter one, pp.2-6.
24. Clive Bell offers "creating significant form" as the relation in the Formalist theory of art. "Embodying emotion" represents one version of the Expressionist theory of art.
25. Dickie presents the first example within the context of his theory,

while the second example is proposed in the alternative formulation.

26. This follows from the fact that a correct analysis of the artworld presents the artworld as little more than society in general.
27. Notions such as "conferring" require that the "artworld" be understood in a more rigid fashion. This produces much of the tension in Dickie's theory.
28. Dickie's account of "conferring artifactuality" leads him away from the notion of "man-made".
29. One must understand artistic activity before one can hope to understand, or define, art. The institutional approach makes clear that art-making is a social activity. Artists make art with the assumption that there will be spectators. The potential importance of this fact is often ignored in traditional theories since artifactuality is taken for granted. For example, by focusing exclusively on the notion of "significant form", and assuming artifactuality, Bell completely ignores this point.
30. Such an understanding helps to clarify the importance of the spectator in the artistic process. "One day in 1957, speaking as a 'mere artist' before a learned seminar on contemporary aesthetics in Houston, Texas, Marcel Duchamp proposed a somewhat surprising definition of the spectator's role in that mysterious process known as creative art. The artist, Duchamp said, is a 'mediumistic being' who does not really know what he is doing or why he is doing it. It is the spectator who, through a kind of 'inner osmosis', deciphers and interprets the work's inner qualifications, relates them to the external world, and thus completes the creative cycle." Calvin Tomkins, The Bride and the Bachelors (New York: The Viking Press, 1962), p.9.
31. This may reflect some of the difficulty experienced in attempting to determine if the hermit can create art. The hermit is in the unusual position of being both the artist and the spectator.
32. An institutional perspective also provides insight into the distinction between "being a work of art" and "being accepted as a work of art".
33. This is a consequence of the fact that the importance of the artifactuality condition is demonstrated by the institutional approach.

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APPENDIX: ARTICLE ABSTRACTS

Aagaard-Mogensen, Lars. "The Alleged Ambiguity of 'Work of Art'", The Personalist, vol.56, no.3 (Summer 1975), pp.305-15.

The article is concerned with the "evaluative/descriptive" distinction in art, and how Dickie makes use of it. The contention is that Dickie's distinction has a definite artificiality about it. Aagaard-Mogensen agrees with Dickie that we generally know whether or not something is a work of art. However, he contends that Dickie has removed the descriptive sense of art from context, and it is the very context in which it is used that gives it meaning. For this reason the distinction fails to do the job Dickie intends it to; the same problems exist as before the distinction was introduced. An additional concern relates to Dickie's comments on tautologies. The suggestion Aagaard-Mogensen makes is that there is nothing unusual about speaking tautologies. Given that this is not unusual, the distinction leads to no less confusion that existed before the distinction was cited.

Anscombe, G.E.M. "On Brute Facts", Analysis, vol.18, no.3 (January 1958), pp.67-72.

This short article represents an attempt to distinguish between different kinds of facts. The distinction that Anscombe is attempting to establish is the one that is now commonly referred to as the "Brute" fact/"Institutional" fact distinction. The former class of facts is considered to be more basic than the latter in that the latter class depends on certain conventions and institutions. Anscombe attempts to demonstrate this distinction by analysing the differences between such statements as "The grocer left some potatoes in a house" as opposed to "John owes the grocer five dollars". The suggestion is that the latter

depends for its truth on the existence of institutions in a way that the former does not.

Bachrach, Jay E. "Dickie's Institutional Definition of Art: Further Criticism", Journal of Aesthetic Education, vol.11 (October 1977), pp.25-35.

Bachrach raises potential difficulties for Dickie's definition of art in two major areas. "The first is that membership in this world is open to everyone; the second, that when one acts in conferring status upon something as a work of art one acts in behalf of the institution." Bachrach's contention is that such open membership opens the possibility that an individual may fail to have his claim that this artifact is a work of art accepted. This follows from the fact that membership in the institution is open and the taking of something as "X" does not guarantee that the object in question is an "X". The second difficulty is that one does not act on behalf of the institution when one confers, but rather one acts in the institution. This undercuts the importance of the institution and leads to the suggestion that the artworld is an institution should not be mentioned in the definition.

Blizek, William. "An Institutional Theory of Art", British Journal of Aesthetics, vol.14, no.2 (Spring 1974), pp.142-50.

In this article Blizek presents a series of objections to Dickie's institutional theory of art. Several objections are presented which relate to Dickie's notion of the artworld. Such an artworld would allow too much to be art, and too easily. Given that membership in the artworld is open to everyone, the question arises as to why a special institution is required. Society at large would seem to be adequate. Limiting membership in the artworld would also present problems. According to Blizek, Dickie wants a defined institution, but no limitations on membership or creativity. This creates a tension in the theory which costs the theory much of its original plausibility. The notion of status of candidate is also problematic, for it seems to have the consequence that one cannot reject an artist's work on the grounds that it is not

art. This seems to be in conflict with what happens very often in the actual world. Problems also exist in trying to retract the status and in deciding in some cases who in fact the artist is. Dickie's concept of appreciation also seems to present difficulties in that no restrictions are placed in what can be appreciated. In addition, it seems to allow the possibility of an object which is appreciated, but not appreciated as art, achieving the status of art. With respect to "artifact", Blizek suggests that Dickie has two concepts; one is "man-made", and the other is "man-handled". This may undercut Dickie's response to Weitz's criticism.

Bywater, William. "Who's in the Warehouse Now?", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol.30, no.4 (Summer 1972), pp.519-27.

The article is intended as a response to Kennick's article "Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake?". Bywater criticizes the two arguments that Kennick offers against attempts to define art with a closed definition based on the essentialist assumption. These two arguments are the "Fruitless Search Argument" (FSA), and the "Warehouse Argument" (WA). With respect to the FSA, Bywater suggests that the argument has force only if Kennick begs the question. It may simply be the case that the tradition has looked for a definition which is too simple. To get more out of FSA than that, contends Bywater, is to beg the question by assuming the logic of the concept of art is not what it has traditionally been taken to be. In response to the WA, Bywater raises three considerations. First he wonders how well Bell could do in the warehouse making use of his definition of "significant form", as opposed to someone who is unfamiliar with the theory. Second, he points out that the WA assumes that ordinary discourse reflects the proper criteria for identifying works of art. Third, he claims the WA assumes that the traditional theories are rigid and closed systems in the same manner as mathematical and logic systems, and then he argues that the traditional theories do not have to accept these assumptions. Bywater also points out that Kennick has distorted many of the traditional theories by lumping them together under "Traditional Aesthetics".

Cohen, Ted. "A Critique of the Institutional Theory of Art: The Possibility of Art", Philosophical Review (January 1973), pp.69-82.

The purpose of this article is to pose several problems that exist in Dickie's institutional theory of art. One suggestion is that the analogy between "making-a-candidate-for-election" and "making-a-candidate-for-appreciation" is inappropriate. Cohen contends that there are qualifications imposed on any potential candidate for election. Dickie's account fails to impose any such qualifications. Cohen offers further criticism by denying claims forwarded by Dickie. Cohen denies that any object can be appreciated. Since candidate-for-appreciation relates to the possibility of actual appreciation, it follows that not any object could be presented as a candidate. An additional suggestion is that there are objects of which appreciation is inappropriate. "Dickie's concrete mistake has been to suppose that Duchamp's 'Fountain' has anything whatever to do with appreciation. Cohen also includes a discussion of illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, with the suggestion that promising is a better analogy than candidacy.

Cormier, Ramona. "Art as a Social Institution", The Personalist, vol.58, no.2 (April 1977), pp.161-68.

Cormier offers criticism of Dickie's definition of art in four areas. Three relate specifically to Dickie's definition, while the fourth concerns the general approach adopted by Dickie. Cormier suggests problems in Dickie's notion of "conferring artifactuality". Second, he contends that Dickie has altered the traditional role of the artist. On Dickie's account it is the act of presenting, rather than the act of creating, which is important. Cormier's third criticism relates to what is art and what is not art. The suggestion is that Dickie's definition fails to match the actual set of art objects. Cormier contends that Dickie's account will allow non-art objects to become art if they are displayed in a museum. "Can not an Egyptian mummy be presented for appreciation in an art museum without it being a work of art?" In addition, art status will be denied to art objects which are displayed in religious settings. Dickie's response to such a counter-example, contends Cormier,

raises questions about the "institutional nature of Dickie's definition". Cormier's fourth criticism is reflected in the following. "Thus I accept Dickie's contention that art is a social concept but deny that present conditions governing some of the artworld's practises are suitable to the understanding and evaluation of the Parthenon, Gothic cathedrals, ...and so forth. To properly handle these works one ought to recognize pluralism in the arts and concentrate on contextual analysis that produce an aesthetic theory which is more than an esoteric discipline having little reference to the artworld's practices."

Danto, Arthur. "Artworks and Real Things", Theoria, vol.34 (1973), pp.1-17.

In his opening paragraph Danto begs indulgence for the style of the essay that follows. It is easy to see why such a request is in order. The article lacks any clear focus and it is difficult to see why it was written. It is perhaps best to regard the essay as a series of footnotes and after-thoughts to Danto's previous article "The Artworld". The only additional insight to be gained into Danto's view on art is found in a series of specific claims. These claims take the form of assertions for the most part. Art requires an artist. Fakes are not art. Artworks have titles. These are representative of the type of claim forwarded. To truly gain any insights through this article, one needs to have read the previously mentioned essay.

Danto, Arthur. "The Artworld", Journal of Philosophy (1964), pp.571-84.

In this article Danto presents an account of the relationship between art and the artworld. He suggests that one requires artistic theory in order to determine what is art. This claim is illustrated by means of an examination of the "imitation" theory of art. Three other important points are suggested within the essay. First, at least one use of the word "is" is not properly classed under the traditional headings. He suggests that there is an "is of artistic identification". Second, the surroundings of an object are important in terms of determining its artistic status. If one has more than one identical object, it is possi-

ble for some to be art while some others are not. Third, traditional theories of art have only served to pick out certain features of art rather than to define art. While the article is associated with the "institutional" analysis of art, it has strong leanings towards the "open concept" theory.

Devereux, Daniel. "Artifacts, Natural Objects, and Works of Art", Analysis, vol.37, no.3 (March 1977), pp.134-37.

This short article discusses the artifact condition of Dickie's definition, and the account of artifactuality that Dickie presents. Devereux presents, what he takes to be, counter-examples to Dickie's account of artifactuality. One such case concerns the hanging of a fern in one's living room, while another relates to the planting of a tree in one's front yard. The claim is that Dickie is committed to the view that the fern and the tree are now artifacts. Such considerations lead Devereux to claim that some internal change is necessary before a natural object can become an artifact. This seems to raise a question about Dickie's claim that being an artifact is a necessary condition. However, Devereux defends the claim, but denies that things such as driftwood can become art. One additional point of importance is made in a footnote. "One could perhaps consider the driftwood together with the wall as a composition and a work of art. But in this case the driftwood would only be part of a work of art; it would not itself be a work of art." This raises important questions about what constitutes works of art.

Dickie, George. "A Reply to Professor Margolis", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol.34, no.2 (Winter 1975), pp.229-31.

This article is intended as a reply to Margolis' review of Dickie's book Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 33-3, Spring '75). Dickie's main criticism of Margolis' remarks concerning the definition of "art" is that Margolis failed to make explicit the fact that Dickie is tentative and uneasy at several points. This specifically applies with respect to the notion of

"conferring the status of artifactuality". Dickie admits in the book that this notion may be problematic and he is critical of Margolis for ignoring this fact. One important feature of the reply concerns a claim that Dickie makes about the notions of "the conferred status of art" and the "conferred status of candidate for appreciation". According to Dickie, these expressions "mean the same thing". However, given Dickie's definition of art, such a claim must be false. The consequence of such an equivocation is to blur and cover the problems in the notion of "artifactuality".

Dickie, George. "Art Narrowly and Broadly Speaking", American Philosophical Quarterly, vol.5, no.1 (January 1968), pp.71-77.

This article is an early attempt by Dickie to work out an account of the aesthetic object. Dickie discusses two ways of characterizing art. The first of these ways he refers to as art "broadly speaking"; the second is art "narrowly speaking". The former is used to indicate the work of art, while the latter is used with reference to the aesthetic object of the work of art. Dickie claims that not all of the physical characteristics of the work of art are part of the aesthetic object. Examples such as the back of paintings are provided in order to demonstrate the viability of this claim. Dickie also contends that some non-visual features of the work of art are part of the aesthetic object. Non-perceptible wires in a ballet are discussed in this connection. The central purpose of the article is two-fold. One, it is designed to show that any account of the aesthetic object in terms of visual properties must be inadequate, and, two, it provides the basis for an institutional, or convention-governed, account of the aesthetic object.

Dickie, George. "An Earnest Reply to Professor Stalker", Philosophia, vol.8, no.4 (October 1979), pp.713-18.

This essay is a reply to Douglas Stalker's "The Importance of Being an Artifact", which appears directly before the Dickie response. Dickie makes two points that are important with respect to his view of artifactuality. He claims that it is possible for an object to be both

an artifact and a natural object. Two, he maintains, even in the face of seeming counter-examples, the claim that it is possible to make an artifact by "picking up and toting" a natural object.

Dickie, George. "Defining Art", American Philosophical Quarterly, vol.6, no.3 (July 1969), pp.253-56.

The article represents one of Dickie's first attempts at offering a complete definition of "art" in terms of an "Institutional" theory. He suggests that the genus of "art" is artifactuality. The differentia is an artifact "upon which some society or sub-group of a society has conferred the status of candidate for appreciation". Both the genus and differentia are to be understood as social properties which are non-exhibited and relational. Dickie makes use of the evaluative/descriptive distinction in defining the genus. The remainder of the essay is dedicated to an examination of questions and problems that relate to the differentia. How is the status conferred? What is it to offer something as a candidate for appreciation?

Dickie, George. "Defining Art II", Contemporary Aesthetics. Ed. Matthew Lipman. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1973, pp.118-31.

This article is, as the title suggests, a follow-up article to Dickie's previous work "Defining Art". The definition has been modified slightly. The second clause now reads "upon which some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain institution (the artworld) has conferred the status of candidate for appreciation". This article demonstrates Dickie's awareness of the problems that may exist within his definition. The bulk of the essay is spent on more carefully explicating and defending the important elements of the view presented in the earlier work. This article is also the first time that Dickie discusses the third sense of "work of art"; the derivative sense.

Dickie, George. "The Actuality of Art: Remarks on Criticisms by Cohen", The Personalist, vol.58, no.2 (April 1977), pp.169-72.

This article is intended as a reply to criticisms forwarded by

Cohen in "A Critique of the Institutional Theory: The Possibility of Art" (Philosophical Review, January 1973). Dickie claims to respond to three specific criticisms. First, the criticism that he assumes Fountain to be a work of art. Second, the claim that his analogy between the artworld and political world is misleading. Third, the fact that certain objects cannot be appreciated. Dickie simply claims that Fountain is a work of art since it is treated like the Mona Lisa in the artworld. According to Dickie, the analogy is appropriate, while perhaps not the best analogy, when understood within the context of his explicit remarks. The last objection is simply countered by claiming that anything can be appreciated.

Dickie, George. "The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude", American Philosophical Quarterly, vol.1, no.1 (1964), pp.56-66.

As the title suggests, this article discusses the notion of the aesthetic attitude, and Dickie's rejection of the notion. Dickie examines two different aesthetic attitude theories. The first is Edward Bullough's theory of "physical distance", and the second is Jerome Stolnitz's account of "disinterested awareness". Dickie criticizes both of these theories on the grounds that they complicate and misinterpret the understanding of an individual's activities without such complications, or misconstrual's, being justified or useful. Dickie then goes on to consider three ways in which aesthetic attitude theories in general mislead aesthetic theory. One, it imposes arbitrary limits on the notion of aesthetic relevance. Two, it misconstrues the relation of the critic to the work of art; and, three, it is incorrect with respect to the relation of morality to aesthetic value.

Dickie, George. "What is Anti-Art?", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol.33, no.4 (Summer 1975), pp.419-21.

Dickie is aware that this question has become popular within contemporary discussions of art. For this reason it seems Dickie feels a need to find a place for anti-art within his own theory of art. Dickie suggests two types of cases that are properly called anti-art within the

context of his own theory. These are "Acconci's art" and "Zero's art". The first case involves performing an action and making a declaration, but not producing an object. The second case involves simply making a declaration. According to Dickie "Acconci's and Zero's 'art' is real anti-art: art because they use the framework of the artworld, anti because they do nothing with it." However this seems problematic. Given Dickie's closed definition "Acconci's art" should be considered art proper, while "Zero's art" should simply be viewed as non-art.

Dickie, George. "What is Art?", Culture and Art. Ed. Lars Aagaard-Mogensen. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1976, pp.21-45.

This essay is merely a reprint of certain portions of the first chapter of Dickie's book Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (Cornell University Press, 1974). The essay is composed of pages 28 to 50 from the book.

Eaton, Marcia. "Art, Artifacts, and Intentions", American Philosophical Quarterly, vol.6, no.2 (April 1969), pp.165-69.

Eaton claims that it is necessary that an object be an artifact before it can be properly considered a work of art. Others have disagreed, claiming that some works of art are not artifacts. According to Eaton, "there are good and decisive reasons for not agreeing with this view". Eaton supports this claim with two contentions. The first is simply that we are, or could be, mistaken when we call pieces of driftwood works of art. A more substantive contention, which supports the previous one, is found in the claim that "just as there can be no warnings independent of intention, so there can be no poems independent of intention". The thesis that would relate to the art question seems to be this. Before something can be considered a work of art, its creator must have intended it to be so considered, "and there seems to be a connection between artifacts and intentions". If this is true it may offer the "good and decisive reasons" needed to refute the view that denies the necessity of artifactuality to art. However, before Eaton can be taken as having presented such reasons, much more argument is required.

Fletcher, James. Review of Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis. By George Dickie. Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol.4, (1977), New York: Cornell University Press, 1974.

In his review Fletcher suggests three difficulties that exist for Dickie's definition of art. First the theory is unevaluative to the point where it fails to provide an adequate criterion for distinguishing art from non-art. It is not clear exactly what such a criticism amounts to, given that the good/bad art distinction is viewed as existing independent of the art/non-art distinction. Second, Dickie has not forwarded a sufficient account of "conferring the status of candidate for appreciation". Specifically, he has not characterized the presuppositions that are involved. Third, Fletcher suggests that the notion of "artifact" is too loosely defined. He suggests that a tighter definition that requires that "the artist work in some medium and actually produce a work of art" is desirable. According to Fletcher, such a definition would resolve some of Dickie's difficulties.

Hospers, John. Review of Culture and Art. Ed. Lars Aagaard-Mogensen. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1976. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol.35, no.2 (Winter 1976), pp.226-28.

Culture and Art is a collection of essays that, for the most part, focus on questions that resolve around the definition of art in terms of an "institutional" analysis. Hospers raises questions about the objectives of such an approach. It is not clear whether such an approach is descriptive or revisionary. The suggestion forwarded by Hospers, is that the advocates of the approach intend the analysis to be descriptive. This is a difficulty, as Hospers perceives, for the "institution" analysis approach to defining art. He then goes on to question the fact that the institutional theory seems to allow the possibility of art objects that do not possess aesthetic qualities.

Jamieson, Dale. "A Note on Originality", Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol.27, no.2 (Summer 1979), pp.221-25.

In this short article Jamieson discusses the suggestion that Dickie forwards in his book, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Anal-

ysis, that his definition should have an "originality" clause. Jamieson distinguishes between two types of "copies". "There are at least two kinds of copies of paintings: reproductions and imitations. Perhaps it is plausible to say that no reproduction of a painting is a work of art. It is surely implausible to say that no imitation of a painting is a work of art." Jamieson suggests that the only tenable "originality" clause could pertain to forged signatures which are intended to deceive. However, this would require knowledge of the artist's intentions. According to Jamieson, "there is no reason to believe that the question of whether or not some painting is a work of art turns on what intentions the artist might have had in signing his name." The conclusion Jamieson draws is that the "originality" condition should be dropped.

Kennick, William. "Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake?", Mind, vol.67 (1958), pp.411-27.

Kennick claims that traditional aesthetics rests on two mistakes. The first mistake is the acceptance of the essentialist assumption; namely, that all works of art must have something in common. The second mistake is in assuming that art criticism presupposes and requires a theory of art. In essence, the claim of the first mistake rests on a Wittgensteinian family resemblance thesis. Kennick supports this by appealing to the fact that people are generally successful in identifying what is art, but fail in identifying objects on the basis of the traditional definitions of art. This in turn suggests why the traditional theories have failed to be illuminating. Rather than offering a definition of art, they have presented one possible means of viewing and examining art.

Lyas, Colin. "Danto and Dickie on Art", Culture and Art. Ed. Lars Aagaard-Mogensen. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1976, pp.170-93.

The article is mainly a discussion of Danto, and only secondarily a discussion of Dickie. Lyas offers criticism of Danto in at least two areas. The first area concerns Danto's claim that "telling art works from other things is not so simple a matter even for native speakers, and

these days one might not be aware he was on artistic terrain without a theory to tell him so". Lyas questions the notion of theory that is involved here. He distinguishes between a strong sense of theory and a weak sense of theory. The former involves an actual formal theory, while the latter involves internalized rules by native speakers. Lyas suggests that only the weak sense of theory is required, while Danto claims the strong theory is necessary. The second area of criticism involves the theoretical revisions that are said to occur within the concept of "art" during periods of significant artistic development. Danto claims this demonstrates a revision of the concept. Lyas contends that an identical concept that recognizes new means of expressing features is consistent with the situation. This is intended to undercut Danto's account of conceptual revision. With respect to Dickie, Lyas suggests that Dickie's account of "candidate for appreciation" is problematic. The question that immediately arises is "appreciation from what point of view?". Dickie wishes to deny the question can be answered with "from the aesthetic point of view.". However, if one tries to answer with "from the artistic point of view" a crude circularity seems to result.

Mandelbaum, Maurice. "Family Resemblance and Generalization Concerning the Arts", American Philosophical Quarterly, vol.2, no.3 (1965), pp.219-28.

The article challenges two of the central theses in an "open concept" approach to defining art. The first challenge involves the notion of "family resemblance". Mandelbaum maintains that the notion of "family resemblance" has two distinct elements. The first involves a non-exhibited connection and the second certain noticeable physical resemblances. The contention is that the former has been ignored by "open concept" theorists. Mandelbaum suggests that it is at least possible that the essential nature of art is found in some relational attribute, which would rely on a non-exhibited connection. The same suggestion is made for "games". The second challenge concerns the claim that a closed definition forecloses creativity. Mandelbaum claims that this becomes an open question once one considers the genetic connection. The article is

a clear presentation of possible problems in an "open concept" approach to defining art.

Margolis, Joseph. Review of Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis. New York: Cornell University Press, 1974. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol.56, no.3 (Summer 1975), pp.341-45.

Margolis' review is negative to the point of being insulting. He systematically attacks Dickie's book chapter by chapter. Since Dickie's definition of "art" is presented in the first chapter, the criticism directed at this chapter is of importance. The criticism centers on Dickie's account of what is involved in the notion of being an artifact. Artifactuality is to be determined without reference to what is a candidate for appreciation. The suggestion forwarded is that such a view is problematic in light of Dickie's account of how natural objects can be "artifactualized without the use of tools". According to Margolis, the resulting situation is such that "we cannot determine whether a piece of driftwood is said to be a work of art in the 'derivative' sense or in the 'classificatory' sense".

Mitias, Michael. "Art as a Social Institution", The Personalist, vol.56, no.3 (Summer 1975), pp.330-35.

The article is a critical discussion of Dickie's definition of "art". Mitias offers criticism in four areas. The first area of criticism involves Dickie's notion of artifactuality. Since he considers artifactuality a necessary condition for art he requires that natural objects which are art be artifacts. This leads to his notion of "conferring artifactuality". Mitias considers this problematic since it seems to "violate the very meaning and usage of the term". The second objection also relates to artifactuality. According to Mitias, "if artifactuality is conferred, the value of artistic creativity would be minimized". Artistic creativity is generally thought to be essential in making art, but conferring is such that creativity is no longer necessary to any degree. Art can be produced with no creativity whatsoever. Mitias' third objection relates to Dickie's analogy between "conferring artistic status"

and "conferring knighthood, etc.". The claim forwarded is that the situations are generally different, and, therefore, the analogy fails to "throw sufficient light on who or how one confers the status of art on behalf of the artworld." Mitias' final criticism involves Dickie's notion of the "artworld". Mitias suggests that "the concept of the artworld is not an adequate principle by means of which the nature of art can be interpreted or defined"; this is because art is logically prior to the artworld.

Morton, Bruce. Review of Aesthetics: An Introduction. By George Dickie. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol.32, no.1 (Fall 1973), Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971, pp.115-18.

In this review Morton suggests several difficulties which seem to exist for Dickie's definition of "art". According to Morton, "Dickie's theory renders it conceptually impossible to create a work independently of the context of an institution....One would have thought that the question whether someone had created a work of art would depend upon what that person alone had done, not upon any other status-conferring activity." One point Morton wishes to draw from this is that the first work of art could never have been created; logically could not have been created. Two other points are of importance. One follows from the fact that almost any member of society has sufficient status to confer. The consequence of this is that any serious reliance on the notion of an institution within the analysis is abandoned. The second point relates to the identification of works of art. "Our artist acquired the status within the artworld by creating a work of art....But this answer requires antecedent grounds for identifying a work of art." This suggests that there is an undesirable circularity in Dickie's definition. All of these points relate to the fact that the artwork seems to be logically prior to the institution.

Osborne, H. Review of Culture and Art. Ed. Lars Aagaard-Mogensen. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1976. British Journal of Aesthetics, vol.16, no.4 (Autumn 1976), pp.377-79.

Culture and Art is a collection of essays that, for the most part,

focus on questions that revolve around the definition of art in terms of an "institutional" analysis. Osborne suggests two serious difficulties that exist for the advocates of such an approach. First, the aim of the theory is to set forth the principles that exist in ordinary discourse for the "masters" of the term art. It is not clear how a determination of the "masters" can be accomplished. Second, the notion of "conferring the status of art" seems to be problematic. Such an approach is problematic in terms of (1) who can do it, and (2) how is it done. Osborne has pointed out some difficulties that must be faced by the proponents of an "institutional" analysis of art.

Radar, Melvin. "Dickie and Socrates on Definition", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol.32, no.3 (Spring 1974), pp.423-24.

In this very short article Radar compares the definition of "holiness" that is offered in the Platonic dialogue "Euthyphro" with Dickie's definition of "art". A distinction is drawn between an extrinsic denomination and an intrinsic denomination. The former deals with the external relations of an object, while the latter characterizes an object's essence. Socrates criticizes Euthyphro for defining "holiness" as "what is pleasing to the gods" as being only an extrinsic denomination. Radar suggests similar Socratic criticism would be directed at Dickie for defining "art" in terms of "being presented as a candidate for appreciation in the artworld."

Richman, Robert. "Something Common", Journal of Philosophy, vol.59, no.26 (1962), pp.821-30.

The question that Richman centers on in this article concerns whether or not all particulars subsumed under a general concept must have "something common". This discussion takes place within the context of an examination of Wittgenstein's "family resemblance" thesis. Richman's contention is that this notion cannot be understood in terms of a "network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing". The claim is that such a notion would not allow for any means by which the extension of the concept to additional particulars could be stopped. Richman even

goes as far as to suggest that "it is difficult to see why we should need more than a single general term". One important point of the article is independent of this concern. Richman contends that Wittgenstein sometimes fails to keep two distinct points distinct, "(a) that all the instances subsumed under a general term need not have 'something common' (etwas gemeinsam), and (b) that many general terms, as they are used, do not have precisely fixed boundaries or rules of application....A term may be vague even though all its referents have something in common, provided that the term describing what is common to the instances is itself vague."

Sclafani, Richard. "'Art' and Artifactuality", Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, vol.1, no.3 (1970), pp.103-10.

Sclafani's purpose in this essay is to establish that artifactuality is a necessary condition for art. To support this claim he argues that "work of art" has a primary sense and a secondary, parasitic, sense. He suggests that a piece of driftwood on a beach that is viewed as a work of art is properly considered to be a "work of art" in the secondary sense. Such an object is a work of art because it resembles paradigms of art. It is not a work of art in the primary sense because it is not an artifact. However, the essay only offers an account of how it is possible to claim that artifactuality is a necessary condition for art. It does not demonstrate that it must be necessary.

Sclafani, Richard. "Art as a Social Institution: Dickie's New Definition", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol.32, no.1 (Fall 1973), pp.111-14.

In this paper Sclafani suggests some problems that exist for Dickie's definition of "art". Sclafani points out that Dickie's use of the evaluative/descriptive distinction and different senses of the word "art" does not eliminate the possibility of "found" art counter-examples to Dickie's definition. All that is offered is an alternative account of what might be happening, not an account of what must be happening. Sclafani also suggests that the account presented as to who can confer

the status is not sophisticated enough to handle the complexity of the situation. It is suggested that two other questions have not been adequately addressed by Dickie. What can or cannot have the status of art conferred upon it? What is it to offer up a product as a candidate for appreciation? Sclafani makes two additional observations. One, Dickie's view does not seem to be of assistance in explaining how we learn and use the word "art". Second, "when we move away from the Duchamp-Warhol type of case, Dickie's definition seems far less plausible."

Sclafani, Richard. "'Art', Wittgenstein, and Open-Textured Concepts", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol.29, no.3 (Spring 1971), pp.333-41.

Sclafani suggests that the claim that "art" is an open concept in the same way as "game" is extremely misleading. He suggests that open concepts, or open-textured concepts, can occur in three distinct manners. All three of these can be found, according to Sclafani, in Wittgenstein. There are extensions of the concept to cases which do not now exist, but ones that we can imagine. There are extensions of the concept to cases which do not exist, but we can not imagine. Third, there are borderline, or hard, cases. Sclafani points to a chair which pops in and out of existence as an example of the first possibility. The second option is present in the imaginary numbers, which were admitted as numbers but could not be foreseen before the development of higher mathematics. Mountain is suggested as a borderline case; the decision between whether or not something is a small mountain or a large hill is pointed to here. Sclafani claims all three are, or could be, present in art. The first case would be a painting that moved by itself. The second and third cases are supposed to be represented by film and "furniture" art. Sclafani suggests such a complete analysis leaves open the question as to whether or not a closed concept is incompatible with expansion and creativity in art.

Sclafani, Richard. "What Kind of Nonsense is This?", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol.33, no.4 (Summer 1975), pp.455-58.

This essay focuses on, what has been labeled, conceptual art. Sclafani's thesis is that such art does not have the significant philosophical consequences that many have taken for granted. One suggestion is that Fountain is a work of art only because Duchamp, an established artist, made it so. Any claim, according to Sclafani, that conceptual art is important must be considered in a sociological and historical perspective. He argues this by examining three possible classes of conceptual art. First, he considers the "ready made movement". Sclafani attempts to tie this movement to the institution of the artworld. Two, he considers the "essays, discussions, lectures, etc. of a self-consciously philosophical, or quasi-philosophical sense." Sclafani claims that he fails to see any serious philosophical implications in such works. The third class concerns activities such as placing colored stripes on doors or bill-boards. The claim is that, since such activity is largely based on recognizable movements, the activity is not artistically radical. Considerations such as these lead Sclafani to assert that conceptual art has no significant philosophical consequences.

Silvers, Anita. "The Artwork Discarded", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol.34, no.4 (Summer 1976), pp.441-54.

The purpose of this essay is to offer criticism of the theories of art that are provided by Danto and Dickie. With respect to Dickie, several distinct criticisms are forwarded. According to Silvers, it is far too easy for an object to qualify as a work of art. This problem may be a reflection of the fact that Dickie views creating art to be a process of christening. This seems to be problematic in that christening is a tool for individuating, while calling something art is a means by which the object is classified. By construing art creation as christening, Dickie leaves open the possibility that every artifact in the world could be "art". Such a situation would make any notion of classification meaningless. In addition, Silvers suggests that part of the problem in Dickie's account is that he has turned the borderline, or hard, cases into paradigms. This undercuts some of the initial plausibility of the account. Perhaps the most important feature of the arti-

cle is the suggestion that Dickie is wrong to construe the work of art as the actual physical object in cases that pertain to examples like Fountain. Different criticisms are directed towards Danto, but one important criticism is directed towards both. On Silvers' account, "both Dickie and Danto make acquisition of the status of art appear to be nearly or totally gratuitous. The Artworld then seems to collapse into anarchy, and anarchy hardly is a state of affairs in which institutions flourish."

Stalker, Douglas. "The Importance of Being an Artifact", Philosophia, vol.8, no.4 (October 1979), pp.701-12.

The essay is a discussion of Dickie's account of artifactuality, and presents two distinct discussions. One, Dickie's view is examined in order to determine if it is an adequate account of artifactuality. Stalker argues that it is not. He does this by means of counter-examples, and by claiming that Dickie understands artifactuality, incorrectly, as a non-exhibited characteristic. Two, Stalker considers the view as a recommendation for a new concept of "artifact". The conclusion reached is that such a recommendation is poor since it results in a failure to adequately distinguish different kinds of human activity.

Tilghman, B.R. "Wittgenstein, Games, and Art", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol.13, no.4 (Summer 1973), pp.517-24.

In this article Tilghman questions any attempt that could be made to give a general answer to the question "What is art?" There are at least two approaches that could be adopted in criticizing traditional aesthetics. One would be to concentrate on the "descriptive" use and argue that it is an open, and not a closed, concept. This approach is adopted by such individuals as Weitz and Kennick. A second alternative would be to consider all of the different uses and, as a result, to suggest that undue concentration on solely the "descriptive" use distorts the true picture of the concept. This approach leaves it open as to whether the concept is open or closed. In fact, the question is construed as making no sense. Tilghman, in this article, adopts the second approach.

Such an approach is as critical of Weitz and Kennick as it is of the traditional theorists. The question is not whether art is an open or closed concept. The issue concerns whether or not the question makes any sense. Tilghman claims that it does not. He supports such a position by examining various situations where the concept is used, and claiming there is no reason to give preferred status to some over the others. The article, as the title suggests, has a Wittgensteinian flavor, and the notion of "forms of life" seems to be central in the discussion.

Walton, Kendall. Review of Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis. New York: Cornell University Press, 1974. Philosophical Review (January 1977), pp.97-101.

The central focus of Walton's review is oriented towards a tradition in philosophy of art rather than Dickie's book. Walton spends much of the review exploring questions that relate to defining art in general. The position he advocates is that defining art is of little significance to aesthetics. "My own view is that the search for a definition is a philosophical dead end." Walton's point is not that "art" cannot be defined, but rather that the definition, if found, would serve no good purpose. With respect to Dickie's account, Walton offers two specific criticisms. One, Dickie has failed to give an adequate account of the "artworld". This is problematic, given that the artworld is a central notion in his theory. Two, Dickie's account fails to provide any insight into art. According to Walton, this "leaves us hardly better off than we would have been had Dickie explained what art is merely by citing paradigms of works of art and inviting us to extrapolate from them." This criticism seems to relate to the testability of the theory.

Weitz, Morris. "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol.15 (1956), pp.121-31.

Weitz's article is an attempt at applying a Wittgensteinian account of language to aesthetics. He claims that traditional aesthetics has attempted to define art in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. All such accounts have failed because they either cannot distinguish art

from non-art or they deny the status of art to things that are in fact art. Weitz then suggests that art should be considered as an "open concept" and that the fundamental question should concern the use of "art" in ordinary discourse. Given this, and the descriptive/evaluative distinction, Weitz maintains that the traditional theories of art are useful in terms of recommendations with respect to the importance of certain criteria for art. The essay is a clear and useful presentation of a Wittgensteinian approach to the question "What is art?".

Ziff, Paul. "The Task of Defining a Work of Art", Philosophical Review, vol.62 (1953), pp.58-78.

Ziff's article is associated with an open concept approach to defining art. Several features of the article are of interest. One is Ziff's claim that it is possible to dispute whether any particular painting is a work of art. There are no exceptions. The claim forwarded is that such decisions are made on the basis of some criteria. It should be noted that no single criterion is to be deemed necessary. The history of the concept of art shows that the criteria can change. With criteria changes, the use of the expression "work of art" changes. Ziff also contends that part of the use of the expression "work of art" is established by the notion of function. How an object is treated is relevant to the use of the term "art". While Ziff's article is an open concept approach, it acknowledges the importance of institutional criteria in the analysis.

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